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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE: Facts and Issues Władysław W. Jermakowicz, Carl J. Bellas  
INTRODUCTION 
The long-term development of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE)
1 largely depends on their success in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to revive 
their economies
2. FDI is the most common vehicle used by foreign investors when entering new 
markets with their own products and technologies. 
The perception of the FDI phenomenon in CEE countries is frequently based on emotional 
prejudices and short run political considerations, not rational economic considerations. Two 
divergent perceptions of the FDI phenomenon exist: at one extreme is the illusion that FDI can 
solve a country’s major economic problems; at the other, the fear that the country will be "sold 
out". Neither of these two perceptions is realistic, and each is detrimental to both the host 
countries and foreign investors.  
It is true that CEE countries have a large potential need for FDI. Foreign investments can be 
the driving forces toward achieving the four following goals: 
*   to combat the lack of foreign capital: At the macroeconomic level FDI inflows can 
provide a source of savings with which to finance the major investment requirements of 
CEE economies, and FDI inflows can provide a source of convertible foreign exchange 
over and above export earnings, thereby releasing funds for debt repayment and 
permitting a higher level of imports. 
*   to accelerate the privatization process of CEE economies: FDI inflows can bring in CEE 
countries the opportunity to link up with Western companies of much greater financial 
strength, which increases their credit stature with potential lenders. 
*   to introduce modern technology and management techniques: At the microeconomic 
level, FDI can be a source of new technology, introduce superior management and 
marketing techniques, provide management and employee training to meet western  
*   to supply the local markets with quality products, as well as provide direct quality and 
design expertise to meet the requirements of Western markets. 
Early optimism about CEE economic reforms and resulting large FDI inflows was based on 
the expected opening up of new markets with good growth prospects, the existence of a skilled 
labor force and low labor costs, and relatively low cultural barriers, particularly for West 
European companies investing in Central Europe. The emergence of a large number of potentially 
                                                 
    
1 In this paper, the Central and East European countries are:  Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
    
2 Foreign direct investment (FDI) occur when a firm invests directly in new facilities to produce a product in a 
foreign country and when a firm establishes an interest in a business entity based in another country by 
acquiring more than 10 percent of the entity’s ownership.  Less than 10 percent of the ownership in a foreign 
business is foreign portfolio investment (FPI). 
 Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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highly profitable new investment opportunities was expected to generate a flow of FDI as well as 
internal funds to finance new investment. 
Since then, both sides have reassessed the potential costs and benefits. To date, the volume 
of FDI into CEE countries has been very small, the technology is in most cases outdated, and the 
management skills of Western investors are disappointing. From the other side, the costs of doing 
business for Western companies in the CEE are much higher than they expected and the 
anticipated benefits have been lower, at least in the short to medium term.  
Is there a more accurate assessment of the current situation?  In this paper, the authors 
attempt to: present the real growth in FDI from a global perspective; examine the structure of the 
CEE investment; put forth some basic political recommendations to promote an active strategy 
and policy towards FDI which the CEE countries can incorporate into the enhancement of their 
indigenous competitive advantage and capabilities. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE:  A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
By 1988 most Socialist countries, with the exception of Albania and East Germany, 
allowed joint venture partnerships with Western capital (Dunning (1993)).  For the entire 
Communist Block countries, 378 firms had foreign partnerships (an 570% increase over 1985) 
with a total FDI of $808 million. In 1993 the number of firms with foreign participation increased 
to 99.5 thousand (263 times over 1988) and the capital invested to $19.5 billion (24 times over 
1988).  (See Table 1.)
3 
In spite of the tremendous rate of growth, these investments have not met the expectations 
of the host CEE governments, causing serious disappointment.  FDI in CEE countries is still in its 
infancy and represents only a small share of worldwide FDI.  During 1985-1993, total world FDI 
in the world economy amounted to $1,350 billion, and accumulated FDI in less developed 
countries (LDCs) in 1993 amounted to $203.2 billion (World 1994).  Therefore, over a 
comparable time the CEE countries attracted approximately 1.5 percent of the world FDI inflows, 
and less than 10 percent of the capital inflows of less developed countries. In 1993 the inflows of 
FDI to CEE amounted 3 percent of the world inflows and 6.2 percent of developing countries 
inflows. In 1993 total FDI inflows amounted an estimated $5 billion in comparison with $5 
billion inflows to Mexico alone in the same year (World 1994).   
Even if the FDI flow into CEE continues to increase at the current rate, it seems unlikely 
that this will divert any appreciable FDI from other regions of the world.  In the year 2000 
projected FDI inflow to CEE would still account for only about 10 percent of all worldwide FDI. 
The decreasing size of FDI per firm seems to indicate that more new firms can be 
established without central consent, encouraging more small foreign firms to enter the CEE 
market. 
                                                 
    
3 The compilation of data on FDI differs from country to country and sometimes even within countries, where 
they are compiled by several government agencies (Statistical Offices, Foreign Investment Agencies and 
National Banks). The differences in criteria used may result in considerable divergence in aggregated FDI 
statistics. As a result, the data are often not comparable and should be used with caution (See: ECE 1994). 
Nevertheless, the general trends are informative and indisputable. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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   TABLE 1. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDIs) IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN  
                    EUROPE IN COMPARISON TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)  
                    (Cumulative data) 
Year Number 
of FDIs in 
CEE 
FDI in CEE 
($Million) 
FDI in LDCs 
($Million) 






































Calculations based on Sader (1993), East-West (1991-1993), Gutman (1993), World (1994). 
THE PATTERNS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
CEE COUNTRIES 
The CEE countries are at different stages in their development.  FDI is rather heavily 
concentrated in Hungary, Russia, Poland, and Czech Republic, which together had 41.4 percent 
of all CEE investment occurrences and accounted for 68.3 percent of total FDI.  Romania ranks 
high in the number of investments (29.3%), but low in the amount of invested capital (3.9%).  
Conversely, Slovenia has 6.2 percent of the FDI but only 3.3 percent of the number of 
investments (See Tables 2 and 3.) 
In 1993, Czech Republic had the highest FDI per firm, followed by Russia and Slovenia.  
Romanian and Lithuanian firms had the lowest, with average FDI investment below $50 thousand 
per enterprise.  (See Table 4.)  These differences indirectly reflect the degree of centralization in 
decision-making by governments.  Central authority is usually required to establish large firms; 
therefore the more centralized the decision process, the larger the average investment. 
FDI projects have tended to decrease in size over these five years.  In 1988, the average 
FDI per firm was $1.68 million; in 1993 this average decreased to $196 thousand.  Apparently 
liberalization of foreign investment has increased the number of small private firms with foreign 
participation
5. 
This principle seems to be confirmed by the analysis of the trends over the last five years.  
In 1988 only large FDI firms were operating, and their establishment was the result of their 
willingness to persevere through lengthy bureaucratic procedures.  For example, Suzuki needed 
seven years to complete its agreement with the Hungarian Foreign Investment Agency in 1991.  
In subsequent years,  
The country comparison seems to indicate that the size of the country is also an important 
factor in average FDI per enterprise.  The smaller the country, the more centralized its decision 
making and the more control the central body exercises over new investment.  In Slovenia, it is 
                                                 
    
4 Based on committed (but not actually implemented) FDI projects. As of December 31, 1993 cumulated FDI 
stock in CEE amounted to an estimated $13 billion (World 1944:98). 
    
5 Undoubtedly, the average size of foreign affiliates in the region is small. For comparison, affiliates in 
developed countries average $18 million in invested foreign equity capital and LDC affiliates average $4 million 
(World 1994). In Hungary only 4 percent and in Poland 1.4 percent of the projects involving foreign investors 
had investment exceeding $1 million (See Chapter 2). Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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the Agency for Privatization and in Czech Republic, the Ministry of Privatization.  These bodies 
make all of the case-by-case decisions concerning foreign investment.  The reverse is true in 
"anarchistic" Poland and Romania where firms with foreign participation can start their activity 
without governmental consent.  The relatively high FDI per firm in Russia seems to reflect 
continued centralized decision making, the result of the traditions prevailing in this country. 
 
   TABLE 2. NUMBER OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN  
                   EUROPEAN COUNTRIES   



































































































































     TOTAL  403  3,014  15,459  32,828  71,170  99,533  100.0 
Calculations based on East-West (1991-1993), Gutman (1993), Rojec (1993), World (1994). 
 
TABLE 3: TOTAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN  
                 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  ($Million), 1988-1993 




































































































































 TOTAL  676.6  2,497  5,159  10,203  14,690  19,493.7  100.0 
Calculations based on East-West (1991-1993), Gutman (1993), World (1994). 
                                                 
    
6 Others also include the Republics that comprised the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (with exception 
of Slovenia) W. Jermakowicz ... 
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PER ENTERPRISE  ($Thousand), 1988-1993 

















































































































     TOTAL  1,678.9  828.5  333.7  310.8  206.4  195.9 
Calculations based on East-West (1991-1993), Gutman (1993), World (1994). 
 
The average size of the firms also depends on the type of foreign investor.  In Poland, 
Slovakia, and Romania,  foreign investors are predominantly natural persons and small firms who 
invest small amounts of capital.  The large multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid these 
countries.  Generally, more than half of the foreign investors in CEE are individuals (natural 
persons), usually  nationals living abroad and using their own connections in the CEE country.  
This is typical for all of the countries where emigration in the last ten years has been especially 
large, e.g., Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. 
The analysis of average amounts invested by foreign investors in different countries shows 
that two stages in FDI development are clearly visible. First stage occurs when liberalization of 
investment conditions is taking place. In this stage over years the average FDI size is declining. 
The second stage appears when the investment conditions are already stabilized, and the average 
FDI increases as a result of larger investors’ interest to enter the country. 
From all analyzed the countries, only Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic (mixed results) are in the second, more advanced stage.  The remaining countries are 
apparently still in the first stage. This measure can indirectly indicate the country’s relative 
maturity in dealing with foreign investors. 
The distinction in the first and second stage countries is closely related to the type of 
commercial legislation prevailing in the country. In the first stage countries, the enclave law 
model
7 still prevails which gives preferred conditions in taxation, profit repatriation, or firm 
registration to foreign firms. FDI laws in this model often constitute the first step in a series of 
market-oriented legislation and can be the core of that legislation around which other basic laws 
evolve.  In the second stage the national treatment law model prevail, where commercial 
legislation dealing with securities, stock exchanges, and bankruptcies is the same for both 
domestic and foreign investors. The enclave model still prevails in Albania, Belarus, and the 
Ukraine, where FDI legislation still provides the legal base for business and investment (Foreign 
1992). By contrast, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech republic adopted separate 
                                                 
    
7 The names for enclave model and national treatment model the authors have borrowed from Kubielas 
(1994). Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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commercial legislation which forms the legislative base not only for domestic but also for foreign 
firms. The remaining countries are in the transitional stage. 
The research conducted in Poland also shows that a negative correlation exists between the 
proximity of the country to the investor’s home country and the amount of capital invested by the 
investor.  The closer the countries, the smaller the average investment.  The smallest firms were 
those established by German investors, and the largest were those established by Americans and 
Canadians (Jermakowicz, Bochniarz 1991). 
  As a final observation, it seems that resource-rich countries (e.g. Russia) have tended to 
attract larger investments. 
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE 
COUNTRIES 
As one would expect, FDI have had a different impact in different CEE countries.  FDI per 
capita is highest in Slovenia ($600), followed by Hungary ($580), Czech Republic ($199) and 
Estonia ($137.5). FDI is the lowest in Albania ($11), Ukraine ($11.5), Russia ($21) and Bulgaria 
($22).  (See Table 5.) 
 
TABLE 5: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS AS GDP SHARE AND PER CAPITA   
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Average   6,746  1,238     22.9      80.1       7.91   2.34%    $133.6 
Calculations based on Gutman (1993), The 1994 Information (1994), World (1994). 
 
The average contribution of foreign affiliates to the gross national product in CEE is 2.34% 
in 1993. FDI as a percentage of GDP is highest in Hungary (10%), Slovenia (6.61%), Estonia 
(3.61%) and Czech Republic (2.98%); lowest in Ukraine (.49%), Bulgaria (.55%) and Russia 
(.66%).  For comparison, in Western economies, FDI as a percentage of GDP varies from 22% in 
Portugal to 40% in Austria.  Generally speaking, the smaller the country by population, the higher 
the ratio of FDI to GDP and the higher the amount of FDI per capita. 
Comparing the population of a country to the number of firms with foreign investment in 
that country is one indicator of investment density.  Countries with high investment density are 
Estonia (360 persons per firm), Hungary (480), Slovenia (600) and Romania (790).  Albania, 
Russia, and Ukraine are at the low end of this scale. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Considering all three indicators, i.e. FDI per capita, FDI/GDP, and population per firm-
investments, one can conclude that FDI has been important in Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Estonia; of some importance in Poland, Slovakia and Romania; and has had only 
minimal impact in Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and the CIS countries. The importance of 
FDI is positively correlated with the size of GNP per capita. The GNP per capita is the highest in 
Slovenia ($10.7 thousand), followed by the Czech Republic ($6.thousand) and Hungary ($5.8 
thousand). The lowest GNP appears in Albania ($803), the Ukraine ($2.3 thousand), and Belarus 
($2.9 thousand).  
In spite of the relatively low role of FDI in CEE, the impact of FDI on the economic 
transition may have been larger than the actual size and relative importance of these investments 
suggest. In the Czech Republic and in Poland, economic recovery is fostered by the increase in 
domestic automobile production fuelled by FDI in the automobile industry (Volkswagen, Fiat and 
GMC). Likewise, in brewing, the best performing sectors of the Hungarian and Polish economy, 
the largest part of the breweries are owned by foreign companies. 
SOURCES OF FDI INFLOWS TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE 
Table 6 lists the amounts of investment from eight investor nations into eight CEE 
countries.  Four countries, Germany, Austria, Italy and the United States, account for 75 percent 
of the total investment from 1989 through June 1993. 
The variability of a source country’s investment (standard deviation divided by the mean) is 
a measure of the dispersion of investments among the eight host countries.  Germany has been the 
largest investor nation but also has distributed its investments across the CEE countries.  Italy has 
placed more than half of its CEE investment in Poland and mainly in two large projects (Fiat-
FSM and Lucchini-Huta Warszawa). 
The entries in Table 7 are the rank of a country’s investments in relation to all other 
investors in the host country.  For example, German-based investments of $218 million in 
Slovenia make it the largest investor there, while its $215 million of investments in Poland make 
it the third largest investor in that country. 
Medians of the rankings provide a measure of the relative importance an individual 
country’s investors play across the CEE countries listed.  Germany is clearly the leader.  Despite 
its relatively low total dollar investment, France’s investments in smaller countries have resulted 
in the second highest median ranking.  The EC and EFTA countries have been the dominant 
investors
8.  The United Kingdom has not been a major source of investment for Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Three factors help explain the patterns evident in the two tables: 
     .  Strong economic ties made it easier for already familiar trading partners from the 
other European countries to upgrade their cooperation to direct investment. 
     .  The nationals from CEE countries residing in Western Europe are formally registered 
as foreign investors from their countries of residence. 
                                                 
    
8 Although not included in the tables, Sweden and Finland are major investors in the Baltic States. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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    .  The political crises in CEE at the end of 1989 and the early 1990s were a lesser 
investment impediment to investors from neighboring countries which were more 
familiar with developments in the CEE because of traditional trading links. 
 
  TABLE 6: COUNTRY SOURCES OF FDI FOR SELECTED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN  
                  COUNTRIES 1989 - JUNE 1993  ($Million) 


















































































    TOTAL  1722  1213.7  906.2  847.8  654  390.3  322  209.6  6,267 
Variability      .97   1.34    1.41   1.19       1.07    1.15  1.37    1.07   
 
 
TABLE 7: RANKING OF SOURCE COUNTRIES’ INVESTMENTS IN CEE COUNTRIES 1989 - JUNE 1993 









































































Median Rank  2  3.5  4  4  5  5.5  8  12.5 
 
There are instances where United State’s firms have made investments in CEE countries 
through their Western European subsidiaries
9. These investments would be included with the 
numbers from the Western European country. As noted in the introduction, the pacific Rim 
countries, including Japan, have been relatively minor investors in CEE. 
Cultural background appears to be very important.  The traditionally close relationships 
between countries constituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire affect the German and Austrian 
investment in Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic.  In Poland, the traditionally 
close relationships with the United States and Italy help explain the investment levels. 
As noted earlier, Germany is investing throughout East Europe because of its traditional 
interest in this region, while American capital has tended to flow into big markets.  This is 
indicated by the dominating position of American capital in Russia (not shown in the tables) 
and Poland rather than Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Albania.  Also, from a geographical 
point of view, as noted by Jermakowicz and Bochniarz (1991), German investment is usually 
located in the western parts of the country, and American investors locate themselves in 
                                                 
    
9 The best example is GMC’s investment in Poland, which is made through OPEL, its German based 
subsidiary.  W. Jermakowicz ... 
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eastern parts of Poland, Slovakia or Hungary in the hope that this will be a future springboard 
to the large emerging markets of Ukraine and Russia. 
  STRATEGIES OF WESTERN INVESTORS 
Generally speaking, foreign investors are following two different generic investment 
strategies in entering the CEE markets.  We designate them Type I and Type II. 
Type I investments are focused on local markets and can be called import-substitution 
FDI.  These investments are made to begin production for local markets of simple products 
and commodities with uncomplicated technology, or the assembly of more technologically 
advanced products, generally to avoid import barriers.  The examples of such investment are 
new establishments of foreign automobile operations in the Polish market (Peugeot, 
Volkswagen, Opel and Volvo).  The investments are made to gain access to the local market. 
Type II investments are export-oriented FDI, which are made to develop firms 
specializing in the production of products for the world market on an integrated basis. For 
example, Skoda, Volkswagen’s affiliate in the Czech Republic; ABB’s affiliates in Poland, or 
Japan’s Daikon affiliate in Hungary provide components to their parent companies on a 
globally integrated basis.  These types of investment are made to achieve a competitive 
advantage through low taxes, a favorable geographical location, access to resources, and low 
labor costs. 
Type I investments are typically smaller because they involve simple processes or the 
final, assembly phase of a process.  It is possible that a successful Type I investment will lead 
to expansion into Type II investment. Nevertheless, first intentions determine the investment 
classification. 
Type II investments are usually larger and involve larger capital inflows (more than 
$100 million).  They include all stages of the production process and result in greater 
autonomy for the CEE enterprise. 
Currently, import substitution strategies dominate, while export-oriented investments 
are still modest. However, the differences among CEE countries permit classification into 
three groups.  The Type I investment group, comprises Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine. These countries succeed in bringing almost exclusively Type I investments. This 
type of FDI includes:  enterprises in mineral resource development (Conoco, Deminex, Elf in 
Russia), in tobacco products (RJ Reynolds in Ukraine, RJR Nabisco in Russia), in 
automobiles (Balcanscar in Bulgaria), and breweries and food processing (Unilever in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia).  
Type II investment countries (Table 8) include Hungary and Czech Republic where this 
type of investment comprises more than 50 percent of all investments (percentages at the 
bottom of the table display the share of the type II investments in all investments in the 
country)
10. 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia form a group of countries with an even mix of Type I 
and Type II investments.  These countries have successfully attracted some large investments 
such as Fiat, Thompson, International Paper, ABB, Black and Decker, and Volkswagen.  Still, 
the majority of firms create Type I investments with production or service for the local 
                                                 
    
10 The five German Bundeslaender established on the basis of the former GDR also belong to this group. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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markets.  For example the largest foreign investment in Slovakia is K-MART, the U.S.-based 
retailer, focusing on serving local markets. 
The volume of the Type I investment appears to be positively correlated with the 
country’s import barriers, the population of the local market, and their purchasing power, i.e., 
the larger the population and the higher the barriers, the higher the likelihood that investment 
will concentrate on the local market.  In this respect, the CIS and Polish markets seem to be 
the most attractive for Type I investors.  The volume of Type II investment, in turn, depends 
on the benefits which a country offers foreign investors, as well as the country’s political 
stability.  The benefits can be either institutional (e.g. long tax holidays, reduced taxes, 
investment in the infrastructure, subsidies, free land) or arise from lower wages, or better 
access to resources. 
The predominant share of Type II investment in Hungary and in the Czech Republic is 
the result of strong government interventionist policies, relatively inexpensive labor and the 
perception of their political stability.  
 
TABLE 8: SOME EXAMPLES OF TYPE II INVESTMENTS IN SELECTED CEE COUNTRIES 
HUNGARY CZECH 
REPUBLIC 















































  Paper 
69% in FDI  73% in FDI  28% in FDI  43% in FDI  46% in FDI 
Prepared from the following sources:  East-West (1991-1993), Sader (1993), Foreign (1992), Bochniarz, 
Jermakowicz, Meller (1994). 
 
Given the above, the CEE governments are facing a dilemma:  should they pursue 
liberal policies that are not attractive to foreign investors or should they pursue active, 
interventionist investment policies that provide investment incentives? 
In contrast to Poland’s liberal policy, the Hungarian and Czech governments offer long 
tax holidays and reduced taxes, free land, and government investment in infrastructure, 
worker training and enterprise subsidies.  For example, in Hungary Audi has received a five-
year tax holiday and a 60% tax reduction for the following five years. Also, Suzuki, Japan’s 
investment in the Hungarian automobile industry was conditioned on high tariff protection of 
domestic automobile production.  Similarly, in Czech Republic, Volkswagen’s engagement in 
Skoda (originally at $5.3 billion) was linked to protective tariff measures on imports and tax 
reductions for 10 years. Also, Philip Morris was aided by increased import tariffs for 
cigarettes produced abroad.  These efforts bring rapid results.  The relative unattractiveness of 
Poland, Slovenia, the Baltic States, and Russia for Type II investors is the result of a lack of 
clear investment policies in these countries.  They are prisoners of their own liberal approach 
to economic doctrine and practice. W. Jermakowicz ... 
CASE Foundation  - 14 - 
MODES OF FDI 
A part of a foreign company’s decision to invest in a particular country is the  selection 
of the most appropriate investment mode.  This depends to a large degree on the investor’s 
motives and the industry.  No one mode is better or worse than another; all depend on 
individual intentions and circumstances. 
There are three basic modes:  greenfield (new) investment; indirect acquisition through 
establishment of a joint venture; and direct acquisition, through which a foreign investor buys 
a share (partially or entirely) in a local company.   
The greenfield mode is selected if the production process is labor intensive.  High labor 
intensity lowers the relative cost of a greenfield venture. Furthermore, greenfield mode is 
chosen when the investor’s name and products are already widely known in the local markets; 
when the costs of restructuring an acquired local company could prove to be higher than the 
establishment of a new operation, and when an unresolved ownership status due to the 
restitution process could be a serious impediment to privatization. 
Indirect acquisition (Joint-ventures) is an appropriate way to gain access to a new 
business if it is uneconomical or risky for a foreign investor to make a greenfield investment. 
This type of acquisition works best when pooling resources and competencies produces a 
competitive advantage.  The foreign investor brings technology and know-how; the local 
partner contributes a plant site, qualified labor, and knowledge of the local laws and 
government operation.  
Direct acquisition (privatization) is likely to be successful if the acquired enterprise is 
in a capital intensive industry, making a greenfield investment very costly. Furthermore, 
direct acquisition is appropriate if the local producer has a strong market share and local 
brand recognition as well as a well developed local supply and distribution network 
(Dunning, Rojec 1993).  
Table 9 illustrates the dramatic change in CEE foreign direct investment modes between 
1988 and 1993.  Although the value of all modes of investment have increased, the 
proportions of greenfield and privatization have increased while that of joint ventures has 
significantly decreased. 
 
   TABLE 9: MODES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE  ($Million) 
Year Greenfield  Indirect 
Acquisition 
Direct Acquisition  Total 























































Calculations based on Bellas, Bochniarz, Jermakowicz, Meller (1994), Sader (1993), East-West (1990-1993), 
Robinson (1993). 
 
Up until 1989 a joint venture was the only attractive and available way to bring foreign 
investment into a state-owned enterprises.  By 1993 a wider range of investment options, 
including privatization and greenfield opportunities, were available. As privatization 
progresses the most attractive enterprises will have found foreign investors or due to 
resistance within a country, may not be available to outside investment. Greenfield Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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investments are likely to become increasingly attractive options, however some countries, 
notably the Czech Republic have not instituted land ownership reforms that are necessary for 
greenfield investment. 
MODELS OF FDI DEVELOPMENT 
John Dunning (1993) has suggested three models of FDI development in CEE countries.  
The gradualistic model (Dunning calls it "the developing country model") is characterized by 
the gradual attraction of inflows of foreign capital.  It is based on the hypothesis that the CEE 
countries are comparable to industrializing developing countries which changed from being 
small to substantial hosts to foreign capital inflows as they moved along a particular 
development path. This model has been applied in South Korea, Taiwan, Malasia, and some 
South American countries. 
The second model is the reconstruction model.  It explains the massive and wide-spread 
involvement of FDI over a short time period. This model recalls the experiences of the 
German and Japanese economies in the years after the Second World War. It assumes that the 
CE countries are highly industrialized and developed, but their industrial structure is outdated 
and inferior to that of the fastest growing, newly industrialized countries.  Massive investment 
will turn them around and bring rapid profitability.  
The third or "mixed" model is a combination of the first two models.  The willingness 
of foreign investors to enter CEE markets depends primarily on the speed and extent to which 
these CE countries alter their economic and legal systems, and also on the ethos of their 
people towards entrepreneurship and wealth-creating activities.  The nature of the systemic 
changes and the rate and efficiency with which they are introduced will determine the rate of 
FDI.  
Foreign investors tend to apply the gradualistic model to Central and Eastern European 
countries.  While this may be superficially pertinent, the underlying assumptions in most 
cases are, however, less appropriate. These countries consume more energy and have a work 
force that is better educated, better trained and well-off medically than most prosperous 
developing countries.  Expenditures for research and development, as a percentage of GNP, 
approach that of some Western countries. 
The Central and Eastern European countries are inclined to expect that foreign investors 
will follow the reconstruction model and will bring large amounts of FDI over a short period 
of time. They seem to disregard such difficulties as the need for a new commercial and legal 
system, the high political risk, and the investment necessary to improve a backward 
infrastructure.  
Given the above, it is likely that the learning process will make everyone’s assumptions 
more realistic.  Foreign investors are using different strategies in different countries.   The 
reconstruction approach, which implies rapid and widespread FDI, is being applied in Eastern 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia.  Investment from west to east within 
Germany has been approximately $100 billion per year.  German investors treat the Czech 
Republic and Hungary as countries within its sphere of interest, and they invested more than 
$500 million there in 1991 and 1992. The Finnish investors, in turn, regard Estonia as their 
own future market and investment area.  
The gradualistic model is applied toward the East European (EE) countries. This path, 
from attracting little to attracting substantial inflows of foreign investment, is used toward W. Jermakowicz ... 
CASE Foundation  - 16 - 
investment in Russia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus.  Investors with 
small amounts of capital apply a "wait and see" strategy before they risk larger commitments.  
The mixed approach is  applied to such countries as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
and Slovakia.  The western investors expect a much slower initial participation of foreign 
investors due to the substantial initial and continuing costs they might have to incur to 
establish production units and market their products. Over time, it is expected that more FDI 
will accompany emerging reforms. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of the 1988-1992 data presented here leads to the conclusion that overall the 
CEE countries’ privatization strategies have not been successful in attracting foreign direct 
investment. The $19.5 billion in investments constitutes only one and one-half percent of 
worldwide investment inflows.  Only about two-third of the enterprises that were granted 
licenses actually commenced operations, a statistic which makes the picture of foreign 
investment even more dismal (Dunning 1993; Jermakowicz and Bochniarz 1991; Kubielas 
1994). 
Equally disappointing is the contribution that FDI has made to the privatization of state-
owned enterprises. The estimated $7 billion of these investments is only a small percentage of 
the initial state-owned equity. In Poland, as shown by Jermakowicz (1994) foreign direct 
investments in privatization projects through June 1993 were only 1.67 percent of the state 
equity as valued in 1989 prices. This percentage is higher in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
but does not exceed three percent. "Internationalization" of CEE enterprises has been a 
substantial contributor to economic restructuring and activity.  
There has been some noticeable introduction of new technology and management 
practices provided by the large multinational investors. The smaller investors who account for 
much of the investment have contributed little. As experts from the Polish Foreign Investment 
Agency note, most of the foreign partners are trying to use already existing equipment 
(Sp￿_ki 1990).  They are using different forms of equipment and machinery leases and 
returning stock payments as shareholders’ dividends to their partners.  The capital stock of 
many companies is kept artificially low. 
Foreign direct investment has not fulfilled expectation that it would increase supplies of 
goods and services to local markets.  The share of the total sale of goods and services 
provided by FDI enterprises is approximately ten percent. More than forty percent of 
enterprises with foreign direct investment are focusing on trade while most of the others are 
involved in simple food processing, textile production, and commodities. 
Several major flaws contributed to these unsatisfactory results. 
First, the recession in the European Union, and investment competition from the 
developing countries could have contributed to the slow growth of FDI in CEE. 
Second, the overall domestic environment in most of CEE countries, with declining 
domestic output, high inflation rates, inconvertible currencies, underdeveloped infrastructure 
and financial services, and lack of the regulatory framework pertaining to land and property 
ownership, is also not conductive to attracting foreign investment. 
Third, in a number of countries, the actual process of building market economy, 
privatization and creating the necessary institutional framework has not advanced 
significantly. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN POLAND Zbigniew Bochniarz, Władysław Jermakowicz, and Michał Meller 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that since 1976 Poland has been the recipient of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the real acceleration of FDI begun after the first free election in June 1989 
and after the beginning of the  "Big Bang - Balcerowicz Program" in January 1990 
(Balcerowicz 1993). These political and economic factors immensely influenced the new FDI 
legislation and dramatically improved the "business climate."  
This paper examines the influx, origin, and strategy of foreign direct investment in 
Poland which we define as a majority or minority ownership in another country’s business 
entity. The paper particularly examines a strong relationship between the historical 
relationships and the past experience of western companies investing in Poland.  
CHANGES IN LEGISLATION 
The first joint venture law allowing full foreign participation was passed by the Polish 
Sejm on 23 April 1986.  From this date forward, foreign investment legislation has become 
progressively more liberal, opening more sectors of the economy to foreign investors, 
allowing the full transfer of profits abroad, and finally, giving the investor more control over 
the venture (Jermakowicz, Bochniarz 1991). 
This process of liberalization of FDI legislation culminated with the law of June 14, 
1991.  This law abolished the former requirement of a $50,000  minimum investment. The 
new law now requires a minimum start-up capital of only $1,000 for a limited liability 
company and $26,000 for a joint stock company.  Furthermore, the 20% minimum stock 
ownership requirement was abandoned, and foreign companies became subject to the same 
taxation as Polish firms.  Special permits are no longer required except in areas dealing with 
operation of sea- ports and airports, real estate agency transactions, defense industry, 
wholesale trade of imported goods, and consulting and legal services. The new legislation 
also removed some investment incentives such as tax holidays of between 3 to 6 years.  Under 
the new law a firm may apply for a tax holiday, if stringent conditions requiring an 
investment of at least 2,000,000 ECU in regions experiencing structural unemployment are 
met.                                                    
POLISH EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY            
There are high expectations about the role of FDI in the transition process, particularly 
in a country with a very limited capacity to generate capital and change its structure due to 
long history of central planning and mismanagement.  Poland expects foreign direct 
investment to play a major role in three areas.   
First, it expects FDI will stimulate the privatization process of Poland’s economy.  It 
expects that this process will not only convert the structure of the Polish economy into an 
efficient one, but will also be a major factor in integrating the economy into the international W. Jermakowicz ... 
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system. Furthermore, FDI is expected to be a strong contributor of  foreign capital which 
Poland needs due to its hard currency shortages.  And lastly, Poles expect from FDI not only 
the introduction of modern technology know-how, but also managerial skills.  The major 
argument is that foreign investment through its introduction of modern technology and 
international connections will change Poland’s export structure to high value added products 
(Jermakowicz, Bochniarz 1991). 
Poland has experienced increasing FDI inflows since 1987.  The largest increase over 
the preceding year occurred in 1989.  In 1988 there were 30 investments in Poland whereas in 
1989, 518 foreign investors entered the country (Table 1).  This dramatic, almost eight fold 
increase in capital and joint ventures numbers in 1988 was beaten the next year when the 
number of  joint ventures increased by a factor of 16.7 and capital increased by 13.7.  It is 
obviously clear that such a dynamic could not be sustained. 
 
TABLE 1: FLOWS AND STOCK OF FDI (FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT) 
Year  Growth of FDI By Number  Growth of FDI by Capital  Average Size of the 
Firm 































































Source: Computation based on the data provided by Ministry of Privatization and the Main Statistical Board 
 
A similar situation occurs with invested capital. Although the number of projects 
increased by 48 percent in 1993, the growth of capital is about 97 percent. The observation of 
the average size of the firm measured by invested capital shows that beginning in 1992, the 
per firm capital contribution each year was greater than in the previous year.  This may mean 
that larger investors are starting to invest in Poland.                                            
GREENFIELD VS. ACQUISITIONS 
A part of a foreign company’s decision to invest in a particular country is the  selection 
of the most appropriate investment mode. This depends to a large degree on the investor’s 
motives and the industry.  No one mode is better or worse than another; all depend on 
individual intentions and circumstances. 
As stated in the Chapter One, there are three basic investment modes:  greenfield (new) 
investment, indirect acquisition through establishment of a joint venture, and direct 
acquisition through which a foreign investor buys a share (partially or entirely) in a local 
company. The last mode is closely related to the privatization process.  
Table 2 illustrates the dramatic change in the structure of the investment modes between 
1988 and 1992.  Although the value of all modes of investment have significantly increased, 
the proportions of greenfield and privatization have changed over these years. 
     Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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TABLE 2: GREENFIELD INVESTMENT AND INDIRECT AND DIRECT ACQUISITIONS IN  
                POLAND (1987-1993) 
Year  Greenfield  Indirect Acquisition  Direct Acquisition  Total 
     $  %      $       %      $       %      $      % 
1987    82 11.8%  614 88.2% 0  0.0%  696  100 
1988    1,686 24.5%  5,194 75.5% 0  0.0%  6,880  100 
1989    26,514 27.5% 54,399 56.4% 15,500  16.1%  96,413  100 
1990    72,992 35.7% 91,266 44.6% 40,200  19.7% 204,458  100 
1991    180,666 42.5%  126,796 31.4% 105,300  26.1% 403,646  100 
1992   320,272  47.1%  9,712  1.4% 350,000  51.5%  679,984  100 
1993   692,092  50.3%    4,934  0.4% 678,903  49.3%  1,377,929 100 
Total  1,294,308 46.4%  293,748 10.6% 1,189,903  43.0%  2,768,006  100 
Source: Computation based on data provided by the Ministry of Privatization and the Main Statistical Board 
 
First of all, an impressive process of increase in the role of greenfield investment is 
observable. If in 1987 only $82 thousand were investments in new companies, then at the end 
of 1993, these investments were more than eight thousand times higher and constituted almost 
half of all FDI inflow (46.4%). This increase is the best indicator of the increase in the trust in 
the Polish market and its growing willingness to start new ventures.    
A second clear observable phenomenon is an increase in the receipts from direct 
acquisition. If in 1989 only $15.5 million was received for firms privatized, which constituted 
16.1% of all inward investment, then in the year 1993 the receipts for privatization were more 
than 42 times higher ($678.9) and constituted 49.3 percent of all inflow. 
The third phenomenon is the decline of the share of the FDI in joint venture 
establishments. If in 1987 joint ventures were the only attractive method to improve the 
financial situation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), then six years later they play a more 
than marginal role (.4%). Apparently, greenfield investment and privatization are  more 
attractive paths. 
The fourth observable process is the relatively faster growth of greenfield investment 
than direct acquisition (privatization) investment.  Privatization was a hit in 1992 when it 
constituted 51 percent, but in 1993 it seems to grow more slowly than new establishments. 
The author believes that greenfield investments will increase at a faster rate than those 
involving privatization. Poland has either already privatized the most attractive enterprises, or 
privatization is meeting increased resistance among population.  Adding to the relative 
interest in greenfield investment is the growing investor confidence in political stability and 
the potential for high returns. 
The role of greenfield investment is more impressive if the number of enterprises is 
compared (see Table 3).  In 1993 there was a total of 10,672 greenfield investments which 
constituted 92.4 percent of all FDI as opposed to 815 indirect acquisitions which comprise 7.1 
percent of foreign investors, and 60 direct acquisitions which constitute a mere .5 percent of 
all cases.  The analysis of the capital invested by both groups, however, shows that indirect 
and direct acquisitions have contributed relatively more capital than greenfield in both 
aggregate amounts and average investment per enterprise. 
Investors acquiring Polish firms directly in the framework of the privatization process in 
the years 1989-1993 contributed $1,189.9 million or 43 percent of the total FDI capital 
contributions.  The average foreign share in capitalization per one firm shows enormous 
differences.  Greenfield investment amounts to only $121.3 thousand per firm, whereas the 
average share in capitalization per joint venture is $360.4 thousand (nearly three times more), W. Jermakowicz ... 
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and per direct acquisition is $18,028.8 thousand (149 times more). Apparently, greenfield 
investments are fairly small shops made by small investors. In privatization through direct 
acquisition, in turn, mostly large firms are involved. 
 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY THE TYPE OF INVESTMENT   
                 (December 31, 1993) 
   Average Size 
of Firm 



















Total 11,553  100.0  2,768,006  100.0  239.6 

















Total 99,533  100.0  19,493,000  100.0  195.8 
Source: Computation based on the data provided by Ministry of Privatization, the Main Statistical 
Board and Jermakowicz, Bellas (1994). See also Chapter One.  
 
The comparison of the Polish FDI distribution to distribution present in other Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEE) show few differences. First, foreign investors entering 
the Polish markets choose greenfield investment to a higher degree than in other post-
communist countries (46.4% vs. 36.1%). This can be the result of both a more liberal 
investment climate existing in Poland or quite the opposite, fears of a restitution process due 
to the lack of the Reprivatization Law. Also the opinion of the strong rebelling trade unions 
existing in Polish enterprises which could be acquired in acquisition cases, contributes to the 
relative popularity of greenfield investment. Through greenfield investment, the foreign 
investors can build the firm and its culture and select a staff according to the owners’ visions 
and desires. Second, the comparison of the distribution of foreign investment by the mode of 
investments also shows that in Poland to a much lower degree indirect acquisition through 
joint ventures is applied (10.6% vs. 28.0%). This may also be an indicator that the Polish 
economy is entering a more mature stage in attracting foreign investors according to the rule 
that the large share of joint ventures in an economy seems to indicate that the economy is in 
its infancy stage.  
Data on the direct acquisition between different the Central European (CE) and selected 
Eastern European (EE) countries also shows different features (See Table 4) 
The comparison of CE and selected EE countries seems to show that the first are much 
more advanced in privatization than the latter.  The small, two million population Slovenia 
sold to foreigners more equity than the 148 million Russia (This situation has already changed 
in 1994.)  Romania is much behind the small Estonia, and so forth. Undoubtedly, the Central 
European countries are more advanced in the road to a United Europe and more attractive for 
West European investors. 
The situation among the CE countries is also very differentiated. Over the years 1989-
1992, Hungary has recorded the largest number of sales (102) and the largest amount of FDI 
in privatization ($2.3 billion). About 81 percent of FDI in this country is accounted for by 
direct foreign acquisition.  Poland is second with 66 privatization projects, however the 
capital invested is very modest ($511 million) and much lower than that in Czechoslovakia 
(46 projects and total capital inflow from privatization of $1.8 billion). In Czechoslovakia, Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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over 1/3 of the foreign investments were made in the companies privatized within Large Scale 
Privatization.  It should be noted that two Central European countries, Lithuania and Latvia, 
had no FDI flowing into the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
 
TABLE 4: DIRECT ACQUISITIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND SELECTED EASTERN  
                 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (data on December 31, 1992) 

















































































Source: Own calculations on the basis: Sader (1993), East-West (1991-1993) 
 
Poland’s situation in comparison to other countries is very mixed. Poland has the second 
largest number of firms acquired through foreign investors but at the same time the average 
size of the sale is the smallest one among central European economies -- one-fourth of the 
size of Czechoslovakia and Slovenia and one-third of that in Hungary. Undoubtedly the 
Polish privatization projects are the smallest ones.  Poland, however, was successful in getting 
the second largest future commitment (1,876.0) after Czechoslovakia ($6.1 billion 
Volkswagen alone) and before Hungary (828.0).  In Poland the future commitments are 3.6 
times higher than the capital invested by foreign firms. This is a typical game pursued by 
Polish managers: lower the sale price because receipts from the sale will go to the State 
Budget, and maximize future commitments because these commitments will stay in the 
company. Unfortunately, many firms have problems in executing these commitments in the 
future.                                                   
MAJORITY VS. MINORITY STAKES 
Foreign investors prefer majority holdings over minority stakes.  Table 4 shows the 
relationship between acquisitions and greenfield investments in terms of equity ownership.  
The general trend suggests an investor preference towards majority holdings, although there 
are some discrepancies between greenfield and acquisition type investments.  Approximately 
1/2 of foreign investment through acquisitions results in minority share holdings between 11 
percent and 50 percent.  The second half falling between 51 percent and 99 percent.  There W. Jermakowicz ... 
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are only 5 acquisitions with  100 percent foreign ownership.  Nevertheless, the tendency is an 
ownership structure of at least 50 percent of shares. 
 
Error! Reference source not found.TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF FDI BY FOREIGN 
SHARE IN CAPITAL 
Foreign share 
in capital (%) 




    Number  %    Number   %    Number    % 
up to 10% 
11% to 49% 
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Total   11,55  100.0    815   100.0    10,7 100.0 
Source: Computation based on the data provided by Ministry of Privatization and the Main Statistical  
             Board 
 
In terms of greenfield investments, we see two different strategies.  In the first group 36 
percent of the investors hold either a minority or a 50 percent stake with about 16 percent of 
greenfield investments having exactly 50 percent of the shares.  The second group or 62 
percent of new start up ventures have a clear majority stake between 74 percent and 100 
percent.  A little over half of this group has a 100 percent ownership structure.  When 
comparing investments between greenfield and acquisitions, the investors choosing the 
acquisition path have a tendency toward a lower share holdings than greenfield investors.  
Since an acquisition in Poland is equivalent to privatization, a large portion of shares becomes 
distributed among employees, the state, and in some cases, creditors or banks.  This partially 
explains the difference in the percentage of ownership associated with foreign investment 
through acquisition. 
In 1992 the major concentration of FDI was channeled into industry; 35 percent of FDI 
entered that sector.  Some of the better known investments are the Italian concern Fiat, 
General Motors, Asea Brown Boveri and Unilever.  Trade accounts for about 8 percent of 
FDI and the remaining investments are distributed among construction, services, and tourism.  
It is interesting that services account for a small percentage of FDI.  The service sector has 
generally been underrepresented in the CEE countries which suggests that this lack of 
competition would attract investors.  One reason for the small inflow of FDI in the service 
sector may be the quick entry of local companies, therefore increasing competition. 
ORIGIN OF INVESTORS 
The majority of investors come from countries bordering Poland or those which have 
historically been Poland’s trading partners.  The role of immigration also plays an important 
part in the source of  FDI inflow.  
In terms of numbers of FDI projects, among 93 countries whose capital is present in 
Poland, four of them (Italy, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands) account for 47.6 
percent of investment projects and 69.2 percent of the capital invested in Poland.  Germany 
has the largest share with 27.3 percent of the total foreign investment projects.  In terms of 
capital, however, Italy occupies the first position, having invested 30.2 percent of the foreign Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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capital. The average size of Italy’s firm amounts to $887.9 million, the result of the large 
capital investments made by Fiat, Luccini Groupe, and Frotrade Financing.  Germany, in turn, 
has a large number of firms with very small average capital amounting to $67.9 thousand per 
firm. According to average investments, Germany is ranked 20th place among all countries. 
From an investment strategy perspective, Italy accounts for 53.8 percent of foreign 
acquisitions in Poland while its share in greenfield investments has been relatively low at 2.9 
percent.  On the other hand, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands account for 69.2 
percent of the FDI projects, and their combined share of greenfield investments is 60 percent. 
While examining this pattern, it is interesting to note the historical relationships which 
are mirrored in today’s investment patterns.  Those past relationships have created a tradition 
or familiarity with the region. Today firms from those countries are less wary of Poland and 
tend to invest greater amounts.  The European Union accounts for 62.2 percent of the capital 
invested, and 61.2 percent of FDI projects.  We see that it holds the majority stake, followed 
by the United States and Canada. Japan has a very low share of both capital (.2 percent) and 
projects (.4 percent); Japanese firms tend to be more conservative in their investment patterns. 
 
TABLE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF FDI BY MAJOR INVESTING COUNTRIES - VALUE OF INVESTED  
                 FOREIGN CAPITAL AT THE END OF 1993 
 Total  Acquisition  Greenfield 
























































































































































































































































Then next observation relates to the structure of FDI. In the case of EEC countries, 2/3 
of all investment is made by acquisition of existing businesses and only 1/3 by new greenfield 
allocations. In the case of the rest of the world, the proportion is quite opposite: two thirds of 
FDI is made in greenfield and only one third in existing businesses. Undoubtedly, W. Jermakowicz ... 
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geographical distance is an important factor: the closer the country the more investment is 
made via acquisitions, the further located country the more greenfield investment seems to be 
attractive.  We see very little investment from the CEE countries; there is some investment 
from the former USSR and that is mostly related to the construction of a gas pipeline form 
Siberia to Western Europe. 
INVESTMENT PROJECTS 
According to the latest information from the State Foreign Investment Agency 
(November 15, 1993) , the total financial involvement of the 173 biggest foreign investors  
(equity and credit) amounts to $2.614 million. The investment commitments of these 173 
investors reach the level of $3.467 million. Table 6 shows the 20 largest foreign investors in 
Poland. The joint venture between the Italian  Fiat and the Small Car Factory (FSM) in 
Bielsko-Biała is the absolute leader on this list both in actual financial  involvement and their 
attitude about future investment commitments. 
 
TABLE 7: TWENTY LARGEST FOREIGN INVESTORS IN POLAND (ON NOVEMBER 15, 1993) 
No. 
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Table 7 shows different modes of foreign investment. Some of them are typical joint 
ventures between foreign investors and Polish state-owned companies (FSM with Fiat, 
Dolmel and Zamech with ABB), involvement in equity privatization through direct buying of 
strategic packages of shares (Kwidzyń Paper Company acquired by IPC, TELFA 
Telecommunications Equipment Company in Bydgoszcz bought by Ameritech), portfolio 
investment in new private companies as well as in privatized ones (Polish American Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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Enterprises Fund, WEDEL with PepsiCo), and typical greenfield investments (Curtis 
International, Procter and Gamble, Warimpex, RJ Reynolds) (Błaszczyk, Dąbrowski 1993).  
These twenty largest foreign investments constitute 55,8 percent of all the investments and 55 
percent of all investment commitments: a high capital concentration of FDI in Poland. Eight 
companies are from the United States, two from Italy, two from France. Very remarkable is 
the absence on the "Top Twenty" list of any companies from Germany, which seems to 
confirm the observation about small average capital investments from Poland’s western 
neighbors. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
POLAND Zbigniew Bochniarz, Michał Meller, David Toft 
INTRODUCTION 
Poland made a historical turn to a pluralistic society with a market economy during this 
period of analysis.  This historically important fact, does not necessarily mean the same for 
foreign investors.  Although, it would be difficult to find foreign investors glorifying the old 
communist regime, many of them, indeed, felt lost in the turmoil caused by the political and 
economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States (NIS).  
For them, these radical changes, although regarded as highly positive, presented distortions in 
the business environment in which they used to operate. 
Despite the pioneering role of Poland in political and radical economic reforms among 
nations in transition, five governments within four years often suggested a lack of political 
stability.   
In the previous chapter we analyzed foreign direct investment data in terms of 
greenfiled and acquisition type investments.  This chapter examines the impact of 
environmental degradation, unemployment, development, and the degree of urbanization on 
the regional inflows of foreign capital into Poland between the years 1990 and 1992.  We 
obtained data on the date the investment was registered, the number of Polish and foreign 
partners, the percent of Polish and foreign share in a proposed joint-venture, the home country 
of the foreign investor and the total capitalization rate of the investment.  This work serves as 
an initial overview of detailed data from the Polish Ministry of Privatization. 
Time 
Figure 1 presents data of FDI by weeks from the end of 1989 to the beginning of 1993. The 
registration peak (close to 120 registrations per week) was reached at the end of 1990, when 
the new budget law was announced canceling three years of tax holidays from January 
1,1991. 









June 14, 1991 Dec 1 - Dec 31 1990
 
The second highest peak of registration took place after the new J-V Law was passed by 
the Parliament on June 14, 1991. Despite the lack of tax holidays, the new law abolished the Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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FDI limits. This particular provision lobbied for a long time by Poles living abroad, resulted 
in an increase in the registration of joint ventures to over 40-50 per week in June 1991. 
Classification of Regions and Assumptions 
For the purpose of our first analysis we have divided Poland into six regions; North, 
East, Silesia, West, Center and Warsaw.   Because almost one half of all joint venture projects 
are located in Warsaw, we have excluded that voivodship from the Central region in order to 
have a uniform base for analysis.  For this reason the Warsaw voivodship is treated as a 
separate region in our analysis and in many cases, investment data from Warsaw has been 
excluded in order better to examine FDI trends.  We have also established indicators of 
development, the degree of urbanization and environmental degradation to serve in this 
analysis.  Much of the analysis is based upon comparisons of the top seven investing 
countries (based on total number of investments).  The top seven were chosen so that Italy, 
the country with the seventh highest number of investments but a large contributor in terms of 
total capital, would be included. 
One significant issue which requires mentioning is the value of foreign capital inflows 
into Poland that are presented in this work.  We use this term to mean not only the 
contribution of the foreign side of the venture, but also the Polish partners contribution which 
can be either in kind or monetary.  Thus, the actual foreign capital inflows would actually be 
smaller than what is suggested in this chapter. 
ANALYSIS BY SIX REGIONS 
We can examine the industrial potential of each of the six regions in terms of industrial 
output sold per capita (Table 1).  We used the final 1992 data from the Main Statistical Office 
to obtain this crude indicator of development.  While we recognize the limitations of this 
measure, it is still instructive for general trends in investment as it reveals preferences of 
foreign investors.  From this perspective, the Warsaw voivodship has the highest per capita 
industrial output sold totaling US$ 2,087 followed by Silesia with US$ 1,868.  The Northern 
and Western Regions have per capita output of US$ 1,450 and US$ 1,420 respectively.   
Finally, Central Poland has per capita industrial output sold of US$ 1,365 and Eastern Poland 
is last with US$ 738. 
 
TABLE 1.  Industrial Output and FDI Per Capita  
 
Region Industrial  Output 
Sold Per capita 
(US$ ths.) 










The highest per capita FDI is found in the Warsaw voivodship, followed by the Central 
and Northern regions which have per capita FDI of US$ 53 and US$ 43 respectively.   
Furthermore, taking into account the limited number of observations, there does not seem to 
be a relationship between our indicator of development and the amount of FDI inflows per W. Jermakowicz ... 
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capita.  Regions that have a high per capita industrial output do not necessarily attract high 
levels of FDI. 
Number, Value of Capital and Average Capitalization Size of 
Firm by Region 
In terms of the number of joint venture projects started, the Warsaw voivodship has 
clearly attracted the largest amount of FDI both in terms of capital and the number of projects.  
Over 3,475 joint ventures have located in the Warsaw voivodship with a combined value of 
capital of US$ 878 million.  This number accounts for 43% of all joint venture projects started 
and 49% of foreign capital inflows into Poland from 1990 to 1992.  This should not be 
surprising, however, since most of the investors will choose to establish their headquarters in 
the capital city. 
 
Table 2.  Number of Joint Ventures and Aggregate Capital Invested  
              by Region (1990-1992) 
 
Region Aggregate  Capital 
Invested  
Number of JV
North 136,934,640  867 
West 158,752,413  914 
Silesia 240,181,471  836 
East 81,643,074  300 
Warsaw 878,794,105  3478 
Center 277,420,926  1538 
 
The largest concentration of FDI (outside of the Warsaw voivodship) is found in 
Central Poland.  This area accounts for 19.2% of all FDI projects and 15% of foreign capital 
invested.  Each of the next three regions, Western and Northern Poland as well as Silesia 
account for approximately 10% to 11% of the total number of FDI projects.  In terms of 
capital, Western and Northern Poland received between 7 and 9% of the total invested capital 
while Silesia experienced considerably larger FDI inflows of 14%.  The smallest 
concentration of foreign capital is found in Eastern Poland where 300 joint ventures were 
established, this number represents 3.7% of joint venture projects in Poland with the value of 
capital invested totaling US$ 81 millions or 4.5% of foreign capital. (Table 2) 
 Capitalization 
Table 3 shows the average capitalization of joint ventures in the six regions.   Our data 
show that the highest level of capitalization is found in the central region where the average 
capitalization of joint ventures is US$ 516,443.  On the other hand, the lowest capitalization is 
found in western Poland, where the average joint venture has a founding capital of US$ 
174,071.  The capitalization rate for the remaining four regions varies from US$ 192,077 in 
Northern Poland to US$ 288,333 in Silesia.   
The high capitalization rate in Central Poland is primarily due to two large investments 
totaling almost US$ 141 million.  Removing those investments from our data reduces the 
average capitalization in the Central region to US$ 181,000.  After correcting for outliers in 
the remaining five regions we find that the order of highest capitalization to lowest Foreign Privatization in Poland 
                                                  - 29 -                                                        CASE Foundation 
capitalization shifts.  Although Central Poland still has the highest founding capital per 
enterprise, the region with the lowest capitalization rate changes from Western Poland to 
Warsaw.  The capitalization corrected for outliers varies from 127,405 in Warsaw to 181,084 
in Central Poland.  Clearly, many small entrepreneurs are investing in the Warsaw region and 
for this reason we see a high concentration of foreign capital with a fairly low capitalization 
rate. 
 
TABLE 3.  Average Capitalization Rate and Corrected Average Capitalization by Region (in USD) 
 
Region Capitalization  Corrected   
Capitalization 
North 192,077  159,226 
West 174,070  135,189 
Silesia 288,333  178,405 
East 273,053  157,855 
Warsaw 252,890  127,405 
Center 516,442  181,084 
 
Table 4 shows the region and the structure of capital invested.  In Warsaw we see that 
over 80% of foreign capital invested does not exceed US$ 100,000 per enterprise.  Similarly 
in Central Poland 74% of foreign investors contributed US$ 100,000 or less.  However, in the 
Warsaw voivodship 16.9% of the joint ventures invested more than US$ 100,000 thousand 
while in Central Poland 22.3% of foreign investors invested more than US$ 100,000.   
Nevertheless, we see that in each region the largest concentration of capital is between US$ 
6,000 and US$ 100,000.  This is consistent with the general trend found in Poland where the 
average capitalization rate per enterprise is quite small. 
We can examine the inflow of FDI into the different regions of Poland based on the 
type of entity that has undertaken the investment.  Usually joint ventures that involve a 
private investor are more numerous than joint ventures that involve foreign institutional 
entities.  Only in the case of Central Poland does the percentage of institutional foreign 
investors exceed the percentage of private investors.  In the remaining regions private 
investors are more numerous.  Our data shows that on average in each region, including 
Warsaw, individuals invest between US$ 94,000 and US$ 103,000, while institutional foreign 
investors invest between US$ 350,000, and US$ 600,000.  This pattern of investment is 
consistent with the general tendency of institutional foreign investors to invest significantly 
larger amounts than individuals  (Figures 2 and 3). 
 
TABLE 4.  Structure of FDI by Largest Capital  Intervals by Region 
 
Region Value 
(in ths. USD) 
Percent Value 
(in ths. USD) 
Percent 
North  6 to 100  54  Up to 6  25 
West  6 to 100  49  100 to 1,000  25 
Silesia  6 to 100  50  Up to 6  27 
East  6 to 100  46  100 to 1,000  28 
Center  6 to 100  52  Up to 6  29 
Warsaw  6 to 100  48  Up to 6  26 
 W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Figure 2: Foreign I nvestor Type by Region























Figure 3: Investor Type by Country
Note: Excluding Italy's Fiat Investment
Foreign Investor Type
























There are clear patterns as to the average level of FDI per legal entity in each of our six 
regions.  (Figure 2)  Silesia has the highest investment in terms of institutional investors.  The 
average foreign institutional entity invests around US$ 600,000, followed by Eastern and 
Central Poland with US$ 560,000 and US$ 550,000 respectively.  It is interesting to note that 
Eastern Poland with the smallest share of FDI has the second largest level of average FDI per 
legal entity.  This is most likely due to large acquisition type investments in that region. 
Regional Distribution of FDI by country 
The largest foreign capital inflows by region can be attributed to seven countries; the 
United States, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, France, Italy and Sweden. Those countries are 
the dominant sources of foreign capital in all six regions.   
In the areas encompassed by our analysis we see that German investors are most 
numerous  in all of the regions.  In the Eastern region, Germany has 100 joint venture projects 
which account for 30% of all FDI ventures in that area.  In Warsaw the number of German 
FDI projects exceeds 450.  American joint ventures are not as numerous as German Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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investments.  However, in the Warsaw voivodship as well as in Central and Eastern Poland 
U.S. investors are second only to the Germans in terms of the number of projects.   
We also see a large number of Swedish investors in the Northern region of Poland, 
where there are more than 150 Swedish joint ventures present in the Northern region.   
Sweden is the only country, from the top seven investing countries, with a greater number of 
investment projects in a region other than Warsaw.   
 
(Excluding Fiat Investment)































Figure 5. M ean Investment Value by Region
(Excluding Fiat Investment)



















When we examine the value of capital invested German firms no longer dominate the 
scene.  In the six regions German joint ventures on average invested less than US$ 300,000 
per firm.  This is consistent with the general trend that German firms are  committing small 
amounts of capital in Poland (Figures 4 and 5). 
On the other hand, American companies have played the leading role in the average 
amount of foreign capital contributed in each region.  Average American investment varied W. Jermakowicz ... 
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from over US$ 100,000 in Silesia to more than US$ 1 million in central Poland.  The three 
regions attracting the largest average American investment were the Central region, Warsaw 
and Eastern Poland.  The average per firm capital invested by U.S. companies into this region 
is twice as high as the average capital invested by all other countries. 
Unemployment 
One issue we aimed to address was the impact of unemployment rate by voivodship on 
FDI.  We wanted to test whether foreign investment was attracted or repelled by areas of high 
unemployment.  We divided the voivodships into quartiles based on the final 1992 unemploy-
ment rates among those economically active citizens.  Of particular note, the Central Region, 
with highest percentage of all unemployed persons in Poland, attracted the second-highest 
level of FDI both in terms of total capital and number of investments.  The Northern region, 
with only 12 percent of Poland’s unemployed, attracted the second-lowest level of investment 
in terms of capital.  This is an artifact of the regions lower population since the area has the 
highest rate of unemployment at 18 percent. 
In general, however, we found that unemployment was not significantly correlated with 
the value or number of investments.  This may be due to the fact that the unemployment rate 
across the regions (and indeed all of Poland) is uniformly very high.  the exception is the 
Warsaw voivodship with an unemployment rate of 7 percent (among the lowest in the 
country). 
Degree of Urbanization  
For this measure, we developed a basic indicator of urbanization by simply calculating 
the ratio of urban to rural citizens.  Through this ratio, 21 voivodships were designated "rural" 
and 27 "urban."  Once again, Warsaw comprised its own category.  In general, we noted a 
tendency to avoid voivodships with predominately rural populations.  Only 7 percent of all 
investments went to such voivodships.  We found that the degree of urbanization was 
positively (though weakly, but significantly) correlated with the percent foreign share and 
negatively (again weakly, though significantly) with percent Polish share.  This lends 
credence to the prediction that foreign share tends to flow toward urbanized areas.  
Ecological Regions 
An important question is what influence does environmental quality have on 
investment?  Do investors tend to come to environmentally degraded regions?  To attempt to 
answer these questions, we divided the 49 voivodships into 3 categories based on the extent 
of environmental hazard.  These environmental categories are based on the Polish Main 
Statistical Office’s 27 ecologically threatened regions. Four voivodships were classified as 
ecological disaster, nineteen as ecologically threatened and twenty-three as clean. 
As with other indicators, Warsaw (a "clean" voivodship according to the above criteria) 
was set aside for this analysis; including it would have skewed the results toward less polluted 
voivodships.  Of 4500 cases, just over 51 per cent went to ecologically threatened 
voivodships, 27 per cent to voivodships with areas of ecological disaster and 22 per cent to 
less polluted areas.  Examining the data by regions, we also observed that the majority of Foreign Privatization in Poland 
                                                  - 33 -                                                        CASE Foundation 
investments went to ecologically threatened voivodships, with the exception of the eastern 
region where 70 per cent of investments went to clean voivodships.  This is a predictable 
result since the East region contains only two ecologically threatened areas.  The North region 
and Silesia saw investments chiefly concentrated in polluted areas; again this is a likely result 
given the amount of environmental degradation in these regions and the urban character of the 
voivodships.  In general, the level of development and environmental degradation are 
positively correlated . 
Figure 6: Investment Number by Environmental Condition











































The total number of investments by country reveals that all of the top 7 countries 
invested most often in voivodships with areas of environmental threat.  The fact that a 
voivodship was clean did not seem to influence any one country’s investment behavior.   
Viewing the average investment value by country according to environmental condition 
reveals a slightly different picture, but and in most cases, the results may also be explained by 
other tendencies.  For instance, Sweden’s heavy involvement in northern Poland helps explain 
its investment in very polluted voivodships (Gdańsk) and Italy’s investment in Bielsko-Biała 
(Fiat) inflates its average value for clean regions (Figures 6 and 7). W. Jermakowicz ... 
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An interesting avenue for further study would be to examine foreign investment by 
economic classification.  Unfortunately, we did not have a complete list of the joint ventures 
according to proposed economic activity.  Such information would permit a deeper analysis 
into the environmental impacts of investment activity. 
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FOREIGN ACQUISITION STRATEGIES IN THE 
POLISH PRIVATIZATION PROCESS (Survey Review) 
Władysław W. Jermakowicz 
Foreign direct investment plays an increasingly growing role in the Polish privatization 
process.  The official data usually concentrate on the statistics of foreign investment 
according to different branches of the economy or regions and countries of origin, but as yet 
they omit the crucial aspects of foreign capital participation in the privatization process.  The 
lack of reliable and systematic official data on privatization through FDI is clearly 
observable.
11 
The research presented in this report is based on a survey made among the largest firms 
with foreign share participation already present in Poland. The survey attempted to 
-  recognize the role of different institutional players (like the State Foreign Investment 
Agency, Ministry of Privatization, executive boards of Polish firms) in the foreign acquisition 
process, 
-  recognize the motives laid down by foreign partners’ decisions to acquire a Polish 
firm instead of making a greenfield investment, 
-  recognize what methods and techniques are used during the foreign acquisition 
process, and 
-    find out what type of governmental incentives are offered to the foreign partners 
entering the Polish market. 
The responses to the survey are maintained in a confidential database. General 
aggregated statistics from the database are reported in this document only. Disclosure rules do 
not allow information to be made public, which could trace the information to a company.  
CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
The Characteristic of the Sample 
Survey questionnaires were sent to 160 largest Polish firms with foreign participation 
from a list provided by the State Agency for Foreign Investment.  The first questionnaires,  in 
the Polish language, were sent on January 7, 1994, with a deadline of March 1, 1994. From 
this questionnaire 31 responses are received. On March 8, 1994 the second follow up was 
made and 129 questionnaires, this time in the English language were sent, to those firms who 
did not respond to the first inquiry. An additional number of 27 responses are received which 
made the total number of 57 responses - a response rate of 35.6 percent. In both cases the 
introductory letter to questionnaires was signed by Dr. Leszek Balcerowicz, the former Vice-
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, the person with the high authority and recognition in 
Poland. 
                                                 
    
11 The only exception is the research done by J. B‡uszkowski and J. Garlicki (1993) on social conditions of 
foreign investment in Poland. That research, however, although very impressive, aims to investigate factors that 
determine why foreign investors take up business activities in Poland. The privatization aspect through FDI is 
regarded very marginally. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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The list provided by the State Agency did not distinguish between firms which entered 
the Polish market by acquiring already existing state owned firms or by greenfield 
investments. Questionnaires were sent to all firms without distinction. Therefore, it is 
necessary to divide responses into two groups: responses from firms which made an 
acquisition, and firms which made a new greenfield investment. In this sample, acquisitions 
were made by 28 foreign firms; and greenfields investment were made by 29 foreign firms. 
  
Table 1.  Structure of responses 







Total 57  100.0 
  
Because the main goal of this research is to analyze the strategies applied by foreign 
firms who take part in the privatization of Polish firms, only responses from firms which 
entered Poland through acquisition of already existing firms were selected. Thus, the survey 
sample comprises only 28 firms.  
The Profile of Acquired Companies in Poland.  
Twenty-eight companies which responded to the survey had a total annual sales in 1993 
of $489.2 million; a total equity of $161.5 million and a total foreign equity of $118.21 
million (See Appendix 1). 
Annual sales ranged between of $2 million and $75 million, with an average  of $17.47 
million. The largest surveyed firms had an equity of $45 million, the smallest $100 thousand. 
An average founding capital was $5.77 million, very high in comparison to the country 
average which is $162 thousand.  Foreign participation in this capital ranged from $10 
thousand to $27.5 million with the average of $4.22 million per firm. The foreign share in the 
total capital ranged between 49.1 percent to 100 percent with an average of 73.1 percent. 
Employment in all interviewed firms totaled 6,413 with the smallest number of 3 in 
company #1 and the highest number of 948 employees in company #24.  
 
Table 2. Employment in different ranges. 
 No. of employees        No of firms             % 
    1-  10   
   11-  50   
   51- 100   
  101- 500   











 Total               100.0
 
The largest share in the sample constituted firms engaging between 11-50 employees 
(40%); the lowest firms employing between 51-100 people (7.1%) (See Table 2). A positive 
correlation exists between annual sales and number of employees (r=.6465  Sig.001). 
The whole group is dominated by limited liabilities companies (JSC Ltd.) -  19, 
followed by joint-stock companies  (JSC) - 7, and sole proprietorships (SProp) - 2 (See Table 
3 and Appendix 1).  Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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The year 1992 marked a record twelve-month period in the process of company 
establishment.  The breakdown of companies in respect to the year of establishment is shown 
in table 4. 
 
Table 3. Legal Status of Pooled Companies 
 Legal status   Number of companies            % 
1. Limited liability company   
2. Joint stock company         







  Total  28  100.0 
 
 
Table 4. Company Establishment Year 
   Year      Number of companies  % 
  1989 
  1990      
  1991             
  1992 












 Total               28  100.0 
 
A8 great number of companies are engaged in the pursuit of multi-business operations.  
A complete list of economic branches, according to ISIC code, involving the largest 
companies with foreign capital is presented in Table 5. 
 
          Table 5. Companies according to type of business 














   % 
1   AGRICULTURE  1   14           2   5.7% 
31   FOOD BEV. & TOBACCO  13             1   2.8% 
32   TEXTILE & LEATHER  7   10   24        3   8.5% 
33   WOOD PRODUCTS          8    16   21        3    8.5% 
34   PAPER PRODUCTS  8             1   2.8% 
35   CHEMICALS & PLASTICS  5   16   20   22   27  28  6   17.1% 
36   NON-MET., MINER. PROD  2   9   19         3    8.5% 
37   BASIC METAL IND.  12             1   2.8% 
381   FABRIC. METAL PROD.  6   11   17         3    8.5% 
382   MACHINERY EXC. ELEC  6             1   2.8% 
383   ELECTR. MACHINERY  6   26           2   5.7% 
384   TRANSPORT EQUIP.  3   18   25        3   8.5% 
385   PROFESSIONAL  EQUIP.  11             1   2.8% 
5   CONSTRUCTION  14             1   2.8% 
6   TRADE & TOURISM  1   4           2   5.7% 
7   TRANSPORT  4             1   2.8% 
8   FINANCE & INSURANCE  15             1   2.8% 
              35    100.0%
 
According to the list industrial production takes the dominant position with three- 
fourth of companies engaged. The largest number of companies is located in branch ISIC 35 -
- Chemicals, Petrochemicals, Rubber and Plastics (6 out of 28) followed by ISIC 32 -- 
Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather, ISIC 36 -- Non-metallic Mineral Products, ISIC 381 
Fabricated Metal Products except a machinery and equipment, and ISIC 384 -- Transport W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Equipment. In each of these ISIC codes, three firms are present. On the average, each firm is 
present in 1.25 branches. 
Profile of Foreign Companies 
On the merits of the pool, there are ten countries on the complete list of foreign 
investors. The largest group of eight firms constitutes companies with German capital 
followed by firms with U.S. capital (4 firms) and British capital (3 firms). The pool, generally 
speaking, seems to mirror the structure of foreign investment in Poland. 
Data on the annual sales of parent companies are only available in 13 firms (See 
Appendix 2). These 13 firms are characterized  by total annual sales of $299,000 million, with 
range of $25 million to $150 million. The average sales of foreign companies amounts to 
$21.3 million.  The sale of the Polish subsidiaries in comparison to foreign parent companies 
is more than miserable and amounts .1 percent of the total sales of foreign firms. 
The data on employment are available for 24 parent foreign firms (See Appendix 2). 
The total employment in these firms amounts to 125,475 with an average of 5,454 per firm. 
The lowest number of employees is 41, the highest of 41.3 thousand. The share of 
employment in Polish subsidiaries in relation to the foreign parent company ranges between 
.3 percent to 57.1 percent with an average of 4.2 percent. It is noteworthy that 4.1 percent of 
the Polish employment share contributes to only .1 percent of the total annual sales. 
 
Table 6. Country of Origin of Interviewed Firms 
  Country   Number of firms   % 
  Germany 
  United States 
  Great Britain 
  Switzerland 
  Austria 
  France 
  Netherlands 
  Sweden 
  Denmark 





















  Total                     28  100.0  
 
Most of the parent foreign companies are engaged in multi-country activities. Only six 
of 28 (21.4%) stress that their only foreign subsidiaries are established in Poland. In the case 
of the remaining 22 firms, their foreign involvement ranges from two countries to 150 
countries with an average of 21 countries per firm (See Appendix 3). The largest number of 
parent countries have their subsidiaries in Great Britain (17 of 28), followed by other West 
European countries like Germany, Denmark, France, and Switzerland (16 each of 28). On the 
top of the overseas countries are the United States (11), Canada (10), and Japan (7), (See 
Appendix 3). 
Institutional framework for privatization and foreign direct investment in Poland.  
In the last five years two government institutions have been responsible for supervision, 
structure, registration and assistance to foreign investment in Polish privatization.  
Until July 14, 1994, it was the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA), that monitored and 
controlled functions, set guidelines, and led the registration process for all new joint-ventures. 
After July 14, 1994, and the imposition of the new Companies with Foreign Shareholdings Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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Act of June 14, 1991,
12 the Foreign Investment Agency is transformed into a politically 
independent joint stock company, so called the State Foreign Investment Agency, without any 
political power and authority. Its role is to promote foreign investment in privatization, and to 
ensure that greenfield projects and private joint ventures are not neglected.  The Ministry of 
Privatization took over role of the political body responsible for setting guidelines, approving 
privatization though FDI programs, and selling state owned companies to foreign investors.  
Therefore, in this report the State Agency is understood to be either the Foreign 
Investment Agency or the Ministry of Privatization depending on the time the foreign 
acquisition happened (before or after July 14, 1991). 
PRE-ACQUISITION STAGE 
Pre-acquisition is the first stage in the complex process of privatization, followed by the 
acquisition (company sale) and post-acquisition stage, when a new owner carries out the 
restructuring process and adapts the firm to market conditions. In the pre-acquisition stage 
decisions are made concerning entering the Polish investment market. Two aspects are 
analyzed: motivation of both the foreign company and Polish side and the acquisition 
strategies applied by both sides.  
Motivation of foreign Parent Company 
All foreign direct investments can be divided into four groups: a. market seeking FDI, 
b. resource seeking FDI, c. efficiency seeking FDI, and d. strategic assets seeking FDI.   
All the investments are "pushed" or "pulled" abroad by different factors; thus they are 
attracted to different countries. Market seeking FDI is attracted to countries with large and 
prosperous markets; resource seeking FDI is almost entirely determined by the availability 
and quality of natural resources in the target economy; efficiency seeking FDI prefers a 
location consistent with that country’s comparative advantage in world markets (thus labor 
intensive FDI are directed to countries with low wages, while technology intensive countries 
are directed to advanced industrial countries and those which offer the best supporting 
infrastructure). Strategic asset seeking FDI will be partly firm specific, but will normally 
take place in countries similar in economic structure and living standards to the investing 
country. This is true except, perhaps, in the case of natural resource sectors and where FDI is 
geared towards buying into unfamiliar markets and distribution channels (Dunning 1994). 
To determine what strategies are applied a question is asked assessing the relative 
importance of different factors in a foreign company’s decision to acquire the local company 
(See Table 7). Factor a. from the questionnaire is closely related to market seeking strategy, 
factor d. to the resource seeking strategy; factors b. c. and e. to efficiency seeking strategies, 
and factors f., g., and h. to strategic assets seeking strategies. 
There is no doubt that the market seeking strategy prevails among foreign firms 
investing in Poland. Almost a forty million consumers market is a factor which is worth 
consideration. In the second place are strategic reasons, especially creation of an export base 
for Central and East European countries. The perspective of free market union between 
Hungary, Czech, and Slovak Republics, and Poland as well with nearly 65 million customers 
is also appealing to potential investors. Efficiency seeking and input seeking strategies do not 
                                                 
12 See Companies with Foreign Shareholdings Act of June 14, 1991 (Dz. U. 1991, No. 60, item 253) in (Doing). W. Jermakowicz ... 
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play any important role. Especially low in importance are possibilities to lower labor costs 
(1.3). It seems that foreign investors are not attracted by the $1.2 average hourly wage of 
Polish workers, seven time below that in Germany. Probably low productivity and threat of 
strikes are the main reasons to disregard the low wages as an investment attracting  factor. 
Also, the possibility of securing input plays more than a marginal role (1.2). 
 
Table 7    Assess the importance of the following factors in a foreign parent company’s decision  










  a/ to get access to the local              
     market* 
  b/ to reduce costs in general          
  c/ to reduce labor costs 
  d/ to secure inputs 
  e/ to increase profit levels**         
  f/ to create export base in     
     general 
  g/ to create export base for CEE                             
countries*** 












































 CORRELATIONS:                                                            
 *    with sales (r=.7839 Sig. 01)                                        
 **   with sales (r=.6932 Sig. 01)                                        
 ***  with sales (r=.6160 Sig. 01) & with employment (r=.0000 Sig. 001)   
 
The major motives of a foreign parent company for acquiring a local company go along 
with these factors. The main motives mentioned by respondents in the open question are 
obtaining the position of the only distributor on the Polish market, developing sales, the 
possibility of obtaining new markets, increasing quality food processing in Poland, accessing 
the Polish telecommunication market, accessing the Polish/Eastern European market. 
Undoubtedly, market seeking motives are dominant. 
The correlation analysis comparing the size of the firm measured by annual sales and 
some of the motives attracting the foreign investors to acquire the Polish company shows that 
a clear distinction between larger firms and smaller firms exists. Firms with high annual sales 
are to the higher degree attracted by the size of the Polish market (r=.7839), the export 
opportunities to CEE countries (r=.6160) and profit level (r=.6932). For smaller firms these 
factors seem to play a less important role. A further analysis will confirms this tendency. 
Other alternatives to investment in Poland 
Any decision to enter any foreign market is associated with an analysis of other 
alternatives for investment. The representatives of foreign investors who took part in this 
study were asked to answer the question: Did you consider alternative countries as investment 
locations when deciding to invest?. The results are presented in Table 8.  Twenty-one of 28 
firms (75%) indicated that they considered other countries for possible investment but 
decided to enter Poland. Only five countries neighboring Poland or located close to Poland 
were considered as an alternative investment opportunity: Hungary (40.7%), Czech Republic 
(25.9%), Slovakia and Russia (each 14.8%), and Lithuania (3.7). 
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Table 8. Did foreign parent company consider alternative countries as investment locations              
             when deciding to invest? 
 NO                                      7(25%) 
 YES                                  21(75%) 
  



















To determine the main reasons for choosing Poland an open question was asked: "what 
urged the decision to acquire the company in question?" As main reasons are given: "the 
flexibility of Poles and their abilities in solving difficult problems," "better developed market 
conditions and less bureaucratic system than in other countries," "high quality of employees 
and managers," "large market", "promising perspective of development," "high 
entrepreneurial spirit of Poles, not present by representatives of other CEE countries." No one 
mentions labor cost-- it seems not to be an attracting motive worthy of note -- and economic 
growth prospects. Discouraging factors mentioned are, obsolete transport facilities, limited 
land purchase possibilities, high rate of inflation, and difficult access to credit.     
Initiative on acquisition on the Polish side 
The representatives of foreign investors were also asked who initiated the target 
company sale on the Polish side. Four governing bodies are mentioned: company’s 
management, government agency, supervisory board, or worker’s council. The assumption is 
made that privatization through FDI can be either state agency driven, management driven, 
workers’ council driven, or supervisory board driven. 
The analysis of the results (see Table 9) shows that in two-thirds cases the idea for the 
cocompany’s sale was brought exclusively by the company’s management, in one-third of 
cases both by the company’s management and the state agency. Only in one case the idea of a 
company’s sale was initiated exclusively by the State Agency.  The supervisory boards and 
workers’ councils did not play a role in the firm’s sale. 
  
Table 9. On the host country side, who was the initiator of the target company’s sale?               
                               No of answers  % 
 (a) excl. company’s management                      
 (b) excl. government agency          
 (c) both             
 (d) supervisory board  












Undoubtedly, Polish privatization through FDI is management driven and State Agency 
driven. State Agency initiative is prevalent in the case of ten large firms which are included in 
the sectoral program of privatization. The company’s management boards are instrumental in 
searching for a foreign partner and for the company’s sale in the case of smaller firms. 
 
Motivation on the Polish side W. Jermakowicz ... 
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It is interesting to analyze why a target company’s management is interested in bringing 
foreign investors. Each such acquisition can bring management termination or --  in the best 
case -- restructuring. Respondents answering an open question about main objectives give 
these reasons: to increase capital opportunities, to get know-how, to gain access to new 
financing, to gain opportunities to increase market share, to finish firm’s restructuring, to 
receive new sources for development in new market conditions, to get access to the new 
technologies, to locate new export opportunities for the firm’s products, to have possibility to 
get access to the new capital etc. The managerial approach to all these questions is clearly 
visible. 
The same approach is also stressed by the answers to questions about the importance of 
different factors (See Table 10). 
 
Table 10.  Assess the importance of the following factors as objectives of target company’s management  
                in attracting strategic foreign investor!  
      










a. to save the company from               
   bankruptcy 
b. to obtain new sources for        
      development financing            
c. to acquire new technology           
d. to preserve employment*             
e. to enter foreign markets            
f. to get management/marketing skills  
g. to obtain access to raw      
   materials, components, inputs       


















































 CORRELATIONS:                                                            
 *    with employment (r=.6993 Sig. 001)                                 
 
The most important motive in attracting the foreign business on the Polish side is the 
necessity of securing the company’s long-term development (2.85), followed by the 
willingness to get management/marketing skills (2.28), and to obtain new sources for 
development financing (2.28).  Surprisingly the lowest value is given for employment 
preservation (1.42), followed with the willingness to obtain access to raw materials, 
components, and inputs (1.46).  The first factor especially seems to indicate that the 
managerial strategic goals of firms development and financing are much more important than 
social objectives of securing employment. 
Correlation analysis shows that the larger the company, measured by the number of the 
employees, the more important is employment preservation factor. A very strong correlation 
between two variables exists (r=.6993). Firms with a larger number of employees tend to 




The major objectives of acquisition expressed by the State Agency Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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The respondents were reluctant to answer the open question: What was considered the 
major objective of the State Agency in acquiring a strategic foreign investor? saying that they 
do not know motives of the government agency. Only three firms responded to this question. 
The first stated that the objective is to save the company from bankruptcy; the second 
company cynically stated that the objective is the need for political success of Minister 
Lewandowski before the coming elections, the third listed the necessity of modernizing 
production and obtaining further investment.  
The answers for the closed question are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11.  Assess the importance of the following factors as objectives  of government agency  
               in transaction with strategic foreign investor  









a/ to speed up privatization  
b/ to collect high purchase price*     
c/ to save the company from bankruptcy 
d/ to secure company’s long-term development      
e/ to speed up local economy’s integration into  
   international economy 
f/ to promote economic cooperation with  

































CORRELATIONS:                                                            
 *    with sales (r=.5515 Sig. 01) & with employment (r=.8693 Sig. 001) 
 
According to the representatives of the foreign investors, the State Agencies responsible 
for privatization and foreign investment place the most importance on such factors as "long-
term development" and "speeding up local economy’s integration into international economy." 
Both of these factors express the developmental aspects and long term goals of integration 
with the world economy. Surprisingly, the operational goals such as revenues to budget 
through price setting, ownership structure (speeding up privatization) as well as economic 
cooperation with a particular country (promotion of economic cooperation with a particular 
country) played a marginal role. The last answer seems to indicate that Poland does not 
differentiate among foreign investors on a favored status. 
Collection of a high purchasing price is positively correlated with the size of the 
company measured both by the annual sales and employment. There are two possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. First, larger firms usually  cost more, and the State Agency 
expects to collect a higher price thus increasing revenues to the state budget. Second, the 
State Agency is to the higher degree responsible for the sale of larger companies than the 
firm’s management. Therefore, this Agency is more persistent in increasing the firm’s price 
than firm’s management for which, as shown above, other factors play a more important role.  
The comparison of management expectations with government expectations shows on 
some dissimilarities. With the exception of the most frequently mentioned answer, "to secure 
the company’s long term objectives (2.85 vs. 2,36), the management stresses opportunities to 
increase management skills, and the possibility of getting access to new resources; the State 
Agency, in turn, stresses the benefits of local economy integration with the world market or 
saving the firm from bankruptcy. The State Agency, apparently, takes a more macro-social 
approach. 
Disagreements between management and government agency W. Jermakowicz ... 
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The institutional conflict between the state agency responsible for privatization and 
privatized firms is natural to any process of privatization.   
The analysis of the results seems to indicate that these differences are, generally 
speaking, non-existent or marginal in Polish conditions (see Table 12). There is no conflict 
concerning inviting and selecting the foreign investor in general. The only disagreements 
seem to reveal some elements of the acquisition process and basic objectives of the 
transactions. These differences concern formal-legal aspects, the reluctance of the state 
agency to sell a company which is in relatively good financial shape in comparison to other 
companies, the price level, the majority vs. minority controlling interest, and the value of a 
sold company. 
                                                                             
Table 12. Were there any disagreements between the target company’s  management  
                and the government agency regarding          
    Factors   Yes   No    %(yes) 
 a/ inviting strategic foreign investor in principle        
 b/ selecting strategic foreign investor in question        
 c/ some elements of the acquisition process and/or contract     














Privatization or greenfield investment 
Once a foreign company has decided for FDI type of involvement, its next step is to 
select the most appropriate FDI modality. The selection to a large extent depends on the 
individual investor’s motive for entering  the country and on the respective industry. In 
principle, no modality is better or worse than other; all modalities depend on individual 
intentions and circumstances. 
The first entry decision concerns the choice between greenfield (internal start up) 
investment and the  acquisition of the existing local enterprise. In the case of Poland this 
becomes a "privatization or greenfield" choice.  As mentioned in the introduction to this 
report, 29 of the sample of 57 firms which responded on the survey are firms which have been 
established in the form of new wholly foreign-owned subsidiary or when privately owned 
company acts as a local partner/target company. These cases are not discussed here; in this 
report the only focus is placed on firms privatized through acquisition or partnership. 
The respondents were asked in an open question: What was the major reason the foreign 
company decided for acquisition instead of a greenfield investment. The answers differ. Some 
firms indicate that acquisition of the Polish firm is the only method to gain access to the 
Polish market. Others mention a time factor--  acquisition takes less time than a new start up -
- the ability to start production after the adaptation of physical resources, lower potential 
restructuring cost for the acquired company than the cost of establishing a new company, 
access to local supply and distribution networks, etc. 
The relative importance of all these factors are shown in Table 13. 
Most important appears to be restructuring costs which are expected to be lower in 
acquisition than in greenfield investment. In second place are the suitability of acquired 
company, acquired market share, and the advantages of the acquired company’s integration 
into the local economy. Local producers already have a strong market share, and foreign 
investors opt to tap into this strength via acquisition. This factor is specially stressed by larger 
companies (r=.8693). Integration with the local economy can be understood as an acquisition 
of existing distribution network (1.92). The local supply network does not play any role in the 
acquisition decision (1.11). Also, both the simplicity of the privatization procedure and Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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acquired company’s export market share play a marginal role. The breakdown of trade links 
after the disintegration of Commecon market contributes to the low importance of the last 
factor.  
 
Table 13. Assess the importance of the following reasons which urged a foreign parent company  









a. acquired company’s local market        
   share*   
b. acquired company’s export              
    markets’ share     
c. acquired company’s distribution        
   network   
d. acquired company’s trade mark/     
    brand name   
e. acq. company’s supply network   
f. advantages of acquired company’s    
   integration into the local  
           economy                        
g. suitability of acquired company/  
     established local partner       
h. favorable price of the acquired    
    company                         
i. acquisition price plus          
   restructuring costs lower than    
     greenfield investment           
j. capital intensity of the activity   






















































































 CORRELATIONS:                                                            
 *    with employment (r=.8693 Sig. 001) 
 
All these factors appear to be closely related to market factors, which seems to confirm 
the earlier observation that the main reason for investor entry is access to the Polish domestic 
market. 
Acquisition modes applied 
Generally speaking, any acquisition can be divided into "indirect FDI privatization" or 
"direct FDI privatization."  
Indirect FDI privatization exists when the existing local non-private ownership is not 
transformed but is combined with new private foreign ownership in the form of a joint 
venture acquisition or through equity increase. In the case of joint-venture, the assets and 
liabilities of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) are contributed as part of the capital in a newly 
formed company.  The State Treasury, via the founding body, owns a part of the shares 
capital of the new company determined by the valuation of the assets and liabilities 
transferred. In the case of equity increase the foreign investor makes a partnership agreement 
with privatized company and  through investment increases the capital of the existing 
company. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Direct FDI privatization  appears when the existing local non-private ownership is 
transformed into private foreign ownership through direct sale in a form of share deal or 
assets deal.  The share deal assumes that the foreign investor can purchase  shares either 
through public invitation to enter into negotiations or through an auction process. The foreign 
investor may initiate the privatization process by making known his interest in acquiring the 
enterprise.
13 The assets deal in Polish conditions, happens when enterprises are privatized 
through liquidation. In this case the assets and liabilities of the SOE are sold to a newly 
formed company to which the State Treasury relinquishes its shares.  When, in the case of 
indirect FDI privatization, the state owned part of the company remains to be privatized, then 
in the case of direct FDI privatization, the direct sale of shares or assets means definite 
privatization of the acquired company. This can have a significant immediate impact on 
improving company’s efficiency. 
As shown in Table 14, among firms which took a part in the study, the most popular 
method of acquisition is indirect privatization through the establishment of joint-venture. This 
mode is applied in 67.9 percent of acquisition cases. In second place is direct privatization 
through the direct sale of shares to a foreign investor. Assets acquisition is used only once, 
and equity increase is not used in any of the analyzed cases. 
  
Table 14. How was the acquisition of the local company structured?                   Through:           
  Type of acquisition                No. of 
answers 
    % 
 (a) JV acquisition:            
 (b) share acquisition:        
 (c) asset acquisition:               











The marginal role of assets acquisition can be explained by the fact that the 
questionnaire was sent to large firms. Privatization by liquidation -- the most popular 
privatization method in Poland-- is, however, applied by smaller firms, and thus this mode of 
acquisition is under-represented in this survey. 
Reasons for choosing JV acquisition 
The open question was asked, "What are the major reasons for choosing the  JV 
acquisition?" JV acquisition  is a joint venture (with the status of a new legal person) formed 
by a part of the existing local company and the new capital invested by a strategic foreign 
investor. In the case of JV acquisition, the local partner contributes as his share only that part 
of his total assets necessary for a certain activity. Therefore, the foreign respondents stress 
that JV acquisition is the least risky solution. They say that foreign investor deals only with 
the entity or assets of his main interest. Additionally, the foreign parent companies mention 
the possibility of gaining control over the company with a minimal investment, the possibility 
of diversifying risk, and the fact that the local company retains proceeds of the sale. In other 
modes of direct privatization, the proceeds go to the state budget.   
Management of the acquired companies as most important stress the possibilities of 
retaining proceeds in the firm and the capital brought by the foreign investor.  
                                                 
    
13 In Poland the shares deal can also be made through the purchase of shares of already privatized companies 
on the secondary market, either through the Warsaw Stock Exchange or OTC transactions. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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The government agency stresses a few factors like the speed of JV acquisition, the 
relevance of the Polish legislation (which is, until mid of 1991, the best suited to JV 
acquisition), and the low risk of JV acquisition. 
The same question was asked in the closed form.               
 
Table 15. If partnership/JV type of acquisition was chosen, assess the importance  
              of the following factors: 









  a/ the only type possible/allowed      
  b/ advantages of having local partner (risk sharing,  
     lower capital exposure, "local" expertise,  
     connections and image) 
  c/ acquisition of only interesting parts of the 
     acquired company 
  d/ avoiding risk of hidden liabilities and debt               
  e/ purchasing money stays in the acquired company    
  f/ avoiding legal and administrative problems        





































       
The 19 firms firms which chose the JV form as a very important indicate advantages of 
being a new company and the fact that JV is the only possible and allowed method. As 
important are mentioned advantages of having a local partner and the possibilities of avoiding 
the risk of hidden liabilities and debt. Surprisingly, unimportant are such factors as the 
possibility acquiring only interesting parts of a acquired company and avoiding the risk of 
hidden liabilities and debt. 
Control over company 
Foreign investors usually insist on managerial control over the company. This is 
commonly achieved through acquisition of at least 51 percent of the company shares. 
Seventy-eight percent of firms which responded to the survey give full control or majority 
control to the foreign party. Twenty-two percent of the firms use a balanced  50:50 relation. 
Fifty-fifty solution is the worst one for the company’s management because no one gets full 
control. It is chosen as a compromise solution when both parties struggle for the majority, and 
the 50-50 compromise appears to be the only solution possible. Only one of the foreign 
investors agreed to a minority owned solution. Control over the acquired company appears to 
be a very important factor.   
 
Table 16. What is the level of foreign ownership in the acquired local company:                                
             # 
anwers 
    % 
 (a) 100% foreign owned 
 (b) majority-foreign-owned 
 (c) 50:50 owned            










Major reasons for choosing majority control through the foreign company are the 
reduction of risk during the first years after acquisition, and an impact on the firm as a whole. 
On the Polish management side, the most important factors are the hope that the foreign firm 
will turn the company around and give an access to foreign markets.                                             W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Contacts before acquisition 
The experience of any joint venture or acquisition shows that in most cases these 
acquisitions are preceded by a long lasting trade relation or an other type of international 
cooperation. To learn how it is in Poland the question was asked, "How was contact made 
between the foreign parent company and the target company/government agency? 
First of all the majority of interviewed companies mentioned that they had no formal 
contacts with the acquired company. They either were invited by the state agency to take a 
part in the tender or in a direct sale, or the firm was discovered by the representatives of 
Polish management group. 
Only 9 of the 28 firms say that they had previous formal contacts; in  most cases they 
are joint export or import activities. In four cases the licenses to the Polish company were 
sold, in two cases the foreign company   subcontracted production to the Polish company, and 
in two cases they entered into  other types of contractual agreements (see Table 17). The 
correlation analysis shows that larger firms are involved in contractual or sub-contractual 
cooperation while smaller firms, in turn, are involved in export and import relationships. 
Pre-acquisition activities 
Both sides, foreign and Polish, participate in a negotiation process and each of them 
conducts pre-acquisition studies. 
 
Table 17. Did the foreign parent company have any previous business cooperation  
               with the acquired company?                                 
  NO      19        71%                            YES     9        29%       
 If YES, what type of business cooperation?   # answers  % 
  (1) exports/imports                              
  (2) licensing                 
  (3) subcontracting                          
  (4) other types of                           
     contractual cooperation                     













  CORRELATIONS:  
  *    with sales (r=.9909 Sig. 001) & with employment (r=.8337 Sig. 001) 
 
The foreign parent company, in almost all cases, conducts industry feasibility studies, 
market research, and a legal audit of the targeted company. In two-thirds of the cases financial 
audit, asset valuation and business valuation are made. For foreign firms the general analysis 
of the industry as well as the legal status of the company are more important than the financial 
aspects. The foreign investors probably do not trust the assets valuation methods used in the 
country and prefer physical over a financial evaluation. In marginal cases an environmental 
audit and overstaffing analysis are made (see Table 18). 
  Business valuations are made by companies with higher sales, restructuring costs 
assessment and overstaffing analysis are made in firms with a higher number of employees. 
Apparently, overstaffing is a problem from the beginning, and foreign firms make an analysis 
of the costs of employment reduction. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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Table 18. What kind of pre-acquisition activities were conducted by the  foreign parent company:                 
 Activities  YES    NO   % 
 a/ feasibility study of the industry                 
 b/ market research                                   
 c/ legal audit of the target company               
 d/ financial audit of the target company            
 e/ asset valuation                                 
 f/ business valuation*                               
 g/ environmental audit                               
 h/ restructuring costs assessment**                  




























 CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *    with employment (r=.6200 Sig. 01)                                    
  **   with employment (r=.6200 Sig. 01)                                    
  ***  with sales (r=.6014 Sig. 01)                                   
 
The Polish State Agency and management of local companies, in turn, put more 
emphasis on the financial aspect of firm’s evaluation. Business valuation is used in 93% of the 
cases, the financial review in 89% of the cases, and asset valuation in more than two-thirds of 
the cases. Marginal situations instigate operational restructuring (13%), working capital 
financing analysis (21.7%) or sale of non-business assets (26.1%). The Agency assumes that 
new owners will take a care of these restructuring activities. Debt restructuring (see Table 19) 
is conducted in 42.8 percent of the cases.                     
 
Table 19. What kind of pre-negotiation activities were conducted by the government agency/target 
company:                               
 Activities  YES    NO   % 
  a/ financial review of the target company*          
  b/ asset valuation                                  
  c/ business valuation**                            
  d/ initiating a competitive bidding process         
  e/ working capital financing                        
  f/ debt restructuring***                            
  g/ operational restructuring                        
  h/ reduction of overstaffing****                    




























  CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *    with sales (r=-.9550 Sig. 001)                                  
  **   with sales (r=-.9550 Sig. 001)                                  
  ***  with employment (r=-.5605 Sig. 01)                                   
  **** with employment (r=-.5605 Sig. 01)                 
 
 The correlation analysis shows an opposite relationship between the size of the firms 
and the financial review or business valuation of the targeted company. The same is true in 
case of debt restructuring and overstaffing reduction. In other words, the higher the annual 
sales, the lower the State Agency’s and management’s willingness to conduct financial 
reviews and business valuations of the companies prepared for sale.  High sales is perhaps for 
sellers the best indicator of the company’s viability and worth. 
The same is true in the case of debt restructuring and overstaffing reduction. The larger 
the employment of the firm in question, the less frequently debt restructuring and employment 
reduction are made. Apparently, the political strength of a company being the result of large 
employment, discourages government and management from any restructuring activities. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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ACQUISITION 
Acquisition is the process of a company’s sales, it is the privatization process per se. 
Two aspects are worth discussion: the bidding procedure and incentives offered by the Polish 
state. 
Major elements of acquisition 
The bidding procedure assumes transparency, participation of consultants on both sides, 
and discussion on key elements of the acquisition transaction. Bidding is usually a lengthy 
process where sellers and buyers try to set a price and establish acceptable sales and 
purchasing conditions for both sides. 
The analysis of responses (see Table 20) indicates that in both the negotiation process 
and the agreement closing, a key role is played by the management boards of the Polish 
company. The boards choose the foreign investor, set the price and discuss the basic elements 
of the acquisition transaction. The legal and financial consultants hired by the government 
agency play secondary role. Paradoxically, the role of the government, although still 
important, is less that of management and consultants. 
According to the foreign negotiators, the procedure of competitive bidding where few 
bidders participate is used only in one-thirds of all transactions. Also in one-thirds of the 
transactions this bidding procedure is transparent. It seems that the managements of targeted 
companies, practically by using subjective methods for foreign partners evaluation, select 
partners which, for some reason, appear to be for them most appropriate. What type of 
reasons are there? 
 
Table 20. Major characteristics of bidding procedure and negotiations:                               
 Activities  YES    NO   % 
  a/ transparent bidding procedure                        
  b/ competitive bidding             
  c/ management of the target company was        
    important in negotiations                       
  d/ hired consultants were important in negotiations     
  e/ government agency was important in deciding on      
     key elements of the acquisition transaction     
  f/ management of the target company was important  
     in deciding on key elements of the acquisition       





























The results provided in Table 21 say that the most frequently applied and most 
important argument used to accept a foreign partner is investment commitment, in other 
words the promise made by foreign investor to make additional investment after the company 
is purchased (2.57). This investment would be made during the next one to five years. In 
second place is the price offered by the foreign investor followed by an employment promise 
to the existing management (1.96). Employment commitment to company’s crew appears to 
be the least important factor (1.71). 
Again the firm’s development de facto appears to be more important than the price 
offered and the promise to keep employment unchanged. This contributes to the unambiguity 
and subjectivity of the applied bidding procedures. In practice, the management decides who 
should be a foreign partner. Furthermore, the management believes that investment 
commitment will bring in future additional capital which will remain in the company, and will Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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be not paid to the State Budget. It is a trade off process between the purchasing price which 
increases revenues to the budget and additional investment which increases the equity of the 
acquired company. 
 
Table 21.  Assess the importance of the following factors in making the ş foreign parent company the  
winner 









 a/ higher purchasing price offered     
 b/ employment commitments      
 c/ investment commitments             
 d/ employment promise to the           
    existing management of the 





















 CORRELATIONS:                                                            
 *    with sales (r=.7334 Sig. 001) 
 
The experience of other countries and other firms shows that the investment 
commitments are very often not kept, and the State Agency is not in a position to execute 
them. In this case the loss is twice as much: the losers are the State Budget and the company 
itself. 
The correlation analysis shows a paradox that the larger the company, the less 
frequently employment security is offered to the existing management. This is due to the fact 
that the bidding procedure in large companies is initiated and controlled by the State Agency 
which is more interested in price level, budget revenues or in employment security than in 
promising employment for the existing management. 
Incentives offered to the foreign parent company by the government agency 
To accelerate economic reforms, Eastern Europe is expecting foreign aid and private 
foreign investment. In the past the governments of these countries tended to believe in a pure 
market system and to assume that once they allowed foreign investment in their countries, 
western companies would rush in. As experience shows, it was a misconception. There is 
tough competition for foreign investment from other areas around the world. Many West 
European and Asian countries as well as depressed regions in Canada and the United States 
offer very attractive incentives to future investors. These incentives are tax holidays, free 
land, subsidies to pay interest on loans, funds to retrain people and to do research, start-up 
expenses, etc. Polish legislation until July 14, 1991, was generous and provided up to six 
years of tax holidays. This provision was changed in the new 1991 law.  According to the new 
law, the Minister of Finance may grant a company up to three years tax holiday contingent on 
a few requirements: the capital invested  has to exceed 2 million ECUs and the activity of the 
company has to be conducted in regions of high unemployment. Additionally, the new 
investment should ensure the introduction of new technologies and enable sales of goods and 
services for export equaling at least 20 percent of total sales value (Doing; Guide). There are 
legal provisions. What is the reality? 
The comparison of survey results presented in Table 22 shows that tax incentives are 
still the most important incentive offered by the Polish government (64.3%). Next comes 
profit repatriation guaranties (53.5%) followed by guaranties of indemnification for hidden 
liabilities and the promise in the help in resolution of overstaffing problems.  The Polish State W. Jermakowicz ... 
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privatization agencies do not offer such incentives as reduction of purchasing price, subsidies 
from government funds, provision of infrastructure facilities, etc.   
 
Table 22.  What guarantees/incentives were given to the foreign parent company  
               by the government agency                                     
 Activities  YES    NO   % 
  a/ tax incentives                             
  b/ reduction of purchasing price         
  c/ loans/subsidies from government funds         
  d/ guarantees of introducing tariffs for         
     competitive imports                       
  e/ profit repatriation guarantees                
  f/ guarantees of indemnification for hidden   
     liabilities   
  g/ guarantees of indemnification for hidden        
     ecological damages                         
  h/ provision of infrastructure facilities         
  i/ preliminary resolution/subsidies for the             









































                                                          
Table 23. How important in the overall decision to acquire the local company were these incentives?             
       (a) insignificant                         
       (b) important                           







 CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *    with employment (r=.6993 Sig. 001) 
 
The incentives given by the Polish State Agency in 46.4 percent appear to be very 
important, in 10.7 percent important, and in 42.9 percent as insignificant. These incentives 
appear to be important in larger companies traded by the State Agency and insignificant in 
smaller firms sold though the firm’s management (r=.6993). 
 
Table 24. What guarantees/promises were given by the foreign parent company                                
 Guarantees  YES    NO   % 
 a/ employment guarantees                             
 b/ best effort employment promise   
 c/ future investment guarantees     
 d/ best effort investment promise    
 e/ employment promise to the existing   

















The foreign investors were also asked what promises they gave to the Polish negotiation 
partners. They admitted that, generally speaking, they accepted the conditions required by the 
Polish side. Future investment guarantees are given in 78.6 percent of cases and best effort 
investment promises in 57.1 percent of the cases.  These two promises are closely followed by 
an employment promise to the existing  management. Employment guarantees or best effort 
employment promises are given in a little more than one fifth of the cases (21.7%). 
The findings from the foreign side confirmed the findings from the Polish side. 
Investment commitments are the most important, employment promises to the firm’s crew, the 
least. Foreign investors in half of the cases stress that they promised employment contracts to 
the firm’s management. Maybe this is an additional invisible price they have to pay for the 
firm’s acquisition. Foreign Privatization in Poland 
                                                  - 53 -                                                        CASE Foundation 
Negotiators 
Who is instrumental in conducting negotiations and closing contracts? The analysis of 
responses shows the dominant role of the management boards of SOEs of JSCs, (78.6 percent 
of the cases). Next is the government agency which is mentioned in seven cases (25%). There 
is no doubt that in three-fourth of the cases, the leading role is played by the company’s 
management and in one-fourth of the cases by the State Agency. The role of worker’s councils 
and supervisory boards is more than marginal. Hired consultants, although instrumental in 
setting a contract, do not have any influence on the process of a company’s sale.  
The correlation analysis confirms the earlier findings that the targeted company’s 
management plays a decisive role in small firms’ acquisition, the State Agency in the case of 
large firms (r=.9561 and r=.6528). 
                                                                       
Table 25. On the host country side, whose role was more important/decisive in negotiations  
               and deciding on key elements of the contract?                                                                                
      (a) target company’s management                 
      (b) government agency                            
      (c) hired consultants                        
      (d) worker’s council                           











     Total    28  100.0 
 CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *    with sales (r=.9561 Sig. 001) & employment (r=.6528 Sig. 001)       
 
Disagreements between the target company’s management and the State Agency are 
present only marginally in one-fourth of the cases, and only in cases of large firms where the 
State Agency plays a leading role in negotiations and decision making on the financial shape 
of a contract (r=.6981).(See Table 26)  
                                                                            
Table 26.  Were there any disagreements between target company’s management and government  
                agency regarding the final decision on key elements of acquisition transaction?                            
    NO                                              





  CORRELATIONS:                                                         
  *    with employment (r=.6981 Sig. 001) 
 
Summing up, the dominant role in acquisition is played by the company’s management. 
The management, using ambiguous bidding procedures and subjective evaluation methods 
tend to eliminate these foreign partners which offer higher prices and selects these investors 
who give promises to make higher investments in the future. This fact has an impact on the 
priorities included in the contract where developmental factors and investment in the future 
are more important than the social factors of employment commitments to the employees. An 
exception, however, exists. The company’s management is usually successful in securing its 
own position in the future management boards. The trade off process is clearly visible: 
contract and future management employment or nothing. Everywhere, the State Agency is 
instrumental in negotiations, the promise of future management employment is absent, but at 
the same time disagreements between the target company’s management and the State Agency 
are present. Everywhere, the management board plays a dominant role in negotiations, the 
same management remains in fact in the new company.  In these cases the social aspect of a 
promise of employment for employees, although stressed by official declarations, plays a 
marginal role. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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POST-ACQUISITION 
The acquisition of the local company not only changes its formal status but also starts a 
new period of the firm’s adaptation to market conditions. Foreign direct investment is closely 
related to expectations that the foreign parent brings new technology, new management 
techniques, new accounting standards, and new organizational culture.  This part of the report 
discusses on to what degree all expectations on both sides are fulfilled, what type of post-
acquisition changes are introduced, what plans are made to expand the existing company, and 
what type of R&D cooperation is apparent? 
Post-acquisition changes introduced by the foreign parent company 
Table 27 presents the changes introduced by the foreign company after acquisition.  
                                                                            
Table 27.  What changes, restructuring operations have been undertaken by the foreign  
                parent company after the acquisition?                                         
 Activities  YES    NO   % 
  a/ financial consolidation                            
  b/ selling of non-business or non-core-                
     business assets/parts of the company              
  c/ reduction of overstaffing*                        
  d/ reorganization of management 
  e/ replacing members of the management    
  f/ training of management   
  g/ introduction of new programs   
  h/ reorganization of marketing activities 































 CORRELATIONS:                                                              
  *    with sales (r=.7383 Sig. 001) & employment (r=.5171 Sig. 01)           
 
There is no doubt that changes introduced by the new management have in most cases a 
cosmetic character. In all cases the reorganization of marketing activities has taken place, 
followed by the introduction of new production programs. In two thirds of the cases also, the 
training of management is conducted.  In half of the cases, financial consolidation as well as 
reorganization of management boards (without exchanging board members) is executed. Only 
in less than in one-forth of the  companies the inviable parts of the businesses are sold, or part 
of employment is reduced. The last occurs only in a big firms (r=.7383). The new 
management goes the easy way by postponing unpopular and complicated decisions. Also, 
only in six of the 28 cases the members of management boards were replaced. The new 
companies, with small exceptions, are continuing the old practices, old organizational culture, 
and old production programs. 
Operational aspects of the acquired company 
The new companies are, in the majority of cases, independent, autonomous units, not 
integrated with the foreign parent companies. They have independent legal status, and their 
accounting system is not consolidated with the foreign system. Only in six cases, and only in 
large companies measured by annual sales (r=.6199) the Polish subsidiary is integrated with 
the international network of its parent company’s activities (see table 28). Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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Table 28. Is the acquired local company                         
 (a) a stand alone entity, not integrated                    
       into foreign parent company’s                              
        activities                                    
 (b) an integral part of foreign parent                       
      company’s (international) network of               













  CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *    with sales (r=.6199 Sig. 01) 
                                                                            
Also in case of the large companies, the Polish subsidiary produces the same goods as 
the foreign parent company (See table 29). 
 
Table 29. Does the acquired local company produce the same 
               goods as the foreign parent company?                                
    NO                                            






The similarity of goods is lower than the share of independent  companies. This means 
that of 22 the independent units, twelve of them (55%) are producing different goods or 
providing different services than the parent foreign companies. In this case it is hard to speak 
about technology or know-how transfer between foreign companies and their Polish 
companies. This is purely a capital investment in most cases in unrelated businesses in an 
attempt to increase risk diversification.  
                                                                                     
Table 30. Have the results of the acquired company’s operations met the 
objectives/expectations?                                 
 A. Of the government agency                  
    (a) yes, fully                            
    (b) only partially           
    (c) not at all                    
    (d) too early to evaluate                    
B. Of the acquired company/its management    
    (a) yes, fully  
    (b) only partially     
    (c) not at all      
    (d) too early to evaluate                        
C. Of foreign parent company:                   
    (a) yes, fully  
    (b) only partially   
    (c) not at all                              
































Table 30 attempts a first assessment of foreign acquisition. The main players were 
asked if the creation of the new company fulfills their objective and expectations. 
In three main players the management boards seem to be the most satisfied with 
acquisitions (13 of 28). Next are the foreign parent companies, whose respondents stressed, 
however, that acquisition met their objectives "only partially."  The State Agency in 22 of 28 
cases (78.6%) mentioned that it is too early to evaluate the results of acquisition. 
In all management driven privatization processes through foreign acquisitions, the 
managers are the group which is the most satisfied with establishment of new company. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Moreover, no one of the main players mentions that the results do "not at all" meet their 
objectives. 
In 26  of 28 cases (93%), the foreign companies express their further interest in 
expanding acquired Polish companies (see table 31). This is the best indicator of the optimism 
which prevails among those investors who acquired Polish companies and responded to the 
survey.  
                                                                                           
Table 31. Has the foreign parent company any plans to expand the acquired local company?                       
    YES                                             





                                                                            
Balance of payments aspects 
When asked about the world market, 22 firms of 28 (78.6%) provided an answer on a 
question concerning export activities. Half of these 22 firms mention that their production is 
destined for export, and half said that they focus on the domestic market. The correlation 
shows a negative relationship between the size of the firms measured by the number of 
employees and the share of production for foreign market (r=-8522). Smaller firms are more 
export oriented than larger firms. The larger firms seem to regard the Polish domestic market 
as their target market. 
 
Table 32. Export and import activities                             
 1.    What percentage of the acquired local company’s production/total sales  
        is destined for exports?*  
 
50.0% 
 2.  What is the regional structure (in %)                   
      of the acquired local company’s exports?             
      (a) Developed countries**                              
      (b) CEE countries***                                   
      (c) Others   







 3.  What percentage of the acquired local company’s  exports is accounted for  
      by foreign parent  company itself****         
 
68% 
 4.  What percentage of the acquired local company’s input is imported?*****     51% 
 5.  What percentage of the acquired local company’s imports is supplied  
     by foreign parent company itself?******                 
 
41% 
 CORRELATIONS:                                                             
  *       with sales (r=-.8522 Sig. 01) & employment (r=-.8271 Sig. 01)     
  **      with employment (r=-.8911 Sig. 01)                                
  ***     with sales (r=.7559 Sig. 01) & employment (r=.8522 Sig. 01)       
  ****    with sales (r=.9213 Sig. 001) and employment (r=.7599 Sig. 01)    
  *****   with sales (r=.8522 Sig. 01)                                      
  ******  with employment (r=.8911 Sig. 01)                               
   
What are directions of this export? The survey shows that 63 percent of the firms export 
their goods to highly developed countries, 30% to the CEE countries and only 7 percent (one 
firms) to other countries. Two opposite tendencies are clearly visible. A negative correlation 
exists between the firm’s size and their export to developed countries (in the case of 
employment r=.-8911, sales r=-.8522) and a positive correlation exists between size and the 
firms’ involvement in the CEE market (r=.7559 and r=.8522 respectively). 
This surprising result shows that large companies acquire the Polish firm to enter the 
Polish or CEE market. Only small companies are interested in re-exporting their products to 
Western markets. This is confirmed by the responses on the next three questions: what Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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percentage of acquired local company’s exports is accounted by the foreign company itself 
(with sales r=.9213; and with employment r=.7599); what percentage of the acquired 
company input is imported (with sales r=.8522) and what percentage of the acquired local 
company’s imports is supplied by the foreign company itself (with employment r=.8911). The 
larger companies tend to regard the export of Polish firms as their own and regard their Polish 
subsidiaries as assembly places for final products from parts provided by parent company.  
Technological and research and development aspects 
In most cases (89.3% of all responses) the acquired Polish companies are 
technologically backward in comparison to those in Western countries. The production in 
Poland, in comparison to production in the foreign parent company, is more labor intensive 
(89.3% responses), or capital intensive (21.4%). In only three of 28 firms (10.7%) the 
respondents state that the production process is more or less identical (See Table 33)                                   
The expectation that foreign parent company will bring new technology or new know-
how prevailed. To what degree are these expectations met? 
 
Table 33. Technological cooperation          
   1.   Production process in the acquired local company is, comparing to the production  
        process in the foreign parent company plant is 
        (a) more or less identical                        
        (b) more labor intensive                                 
        (c) more capital intensive                              













   2.   Did the foreign parent company transfer its technology/know-how  







        If YES, in what form?                                               
        (a) machinery/equipment                                    







   3.   Has the transferred technology/product been in any way adapted  










   4.   Has the acquired local company itself made (or intends to make)  







  5.    Is there (or is intended to be) any direct cooperation between  
        the foreign parent company and the acquired local company  










        If YES, what is the type of this cooperation?                       
        (a) exchange of literature and other information             
        (b) regular exchange of research results                  
        (c) regular exchange of experts             
        (d) ad hoc exchange of experts                       














The survey shows that in all cases where technological superiority of foreign firms is 
evident, the foreign firms plan to transfer their technology to the Polish firm. In 23 of 25 firms 
(82.1%) this transfer is in the form of industrial property rights, and in 20 of 25 cases (71.4%) 
in the form of machinery and equipment. Additionally other transfers occur: training of 
management and employees, manufacturing and marketing know how, the computerization of 
the firm, transfer of organizational and managerial know-how, etc. 
In 21 of 28 cases (75%) this new technology or know-how is adopted. In 20 out of 28 
cases (71.4%) the acquired company intends or already has made their own improvements in 
received technologies, or they have developed products to adapt them to firm’s conditions or W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Polish markets. In most cases (75%) close direct cooperation is intended between the foreign 
company and its Polish subsidiary. 
What type of cooperation is it? 
In 17  of 21 cases this cooperation takes the form of a regular exchange of research 
results and a regular exchange of experts. In 12 of 21 cases (57.1%) it takes a form of joint 
research. In one-thirds of the cases an exchange of literature and an ad hoc exchange of 
experts takes place.                                    
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The respondents were asked the question: How can the restructuring and development 
impact of foreign acquisitions on the acquired companies and host country to be improved? 
They were particularly asked to define the three most important host country measures or 
instruments which could improve the restructuring and development impact of foreign 
acquisitions on the acquired company/host country. 
Respondents gave these measures as most important: 
-   to stabilize the functioning of the Polish economy especially in the area of tax policy 
and business law, 
-     to stop inflation and the devaluation of zloty, because the high cost of credit hinders 
investment policy, 
-   because of the negative attitude of state and local authorities to the companies with 
foreign capital, to secure a clear governmental declaration concerning foreign 
investment with consistent fulfillment of these declarations,  
-    to improve financial terms and conditions of business activities in Poland, and to 
improve the operation of the Polish banking system, 
-   to stabilize the government’s tariff policy, 
-   to introduce a coherent and reliable insurance system inclusive of credit insurance, 
-   to remove the constraints on the acquisition of real estate by non-Polish entities, a 
grave impediments which discourages the inflow of foreign capital to various ares, 
agriculture included. This legislation, dating back to 1920 must be revised for various 
reasons including Poland’s pursuit of European Union membership. 
-    to revise current foreign exchange legislation to facilitate borrowing from foreign 
lenders and to allow foreign businesses to make time deposits with Polish banks. 
-   to  modify the existing system of licenses and permits for establishing production. 
These instruments can be justifiably applied to protect domestic producers, but have to 
be used in a best, carefully considered manner. 
-   to introduce simplified investment procedures allowing acquisition of only interesting 
parts of the company and to lower purchasing price, 
-   to allow the gradual reduction of the number of employees 
-   to lower the tax burden, through elimination of the impact of inflation on the price of 
assets and the level of income, Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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-   to introduce a legal disclaimer from future ownership claims from possible previous 
owners, 
-   to lower the influence of trade unions 
-    to undertake actions to change public opinion about joint stock companies with 
foreign capital in Poland, 
-   to bring additional capital influx, 
-   to encourage the further transfer of production and technology. 
CONCLUSIONS    
The survey clearly divides all enterprises into large firms and small firms and displays 
basic differences in their business behavior. 
Large firms 
The privatization of large firms is State Agency driven. The Ministry of Privatization or 
the Foreign Investment Agency (before July 14, 1991) announces the bid, selects the foreign 
partner, leads all stages of negotiations with a heavy use of consultants, controls bidding 
procedures and closes the contract. All stages are completed in the framework of the so called 
sectoral approach to privatization. To be privatized, large companies have to be in one of the 
36 sectors of Poland’s economy designated for sectoral privatization. 
The State Agency offers some incentives to these large firms. The most frequently used 
incentives are tax holidays; others, like higher import tariff for products produced by the new 
company or retraining programs for laid off employees are used less frequently and only in 
the case of very prestigious firms. 
The State Agency in the negotiations process takes into account macro-social aspects 
such as employment security for employees, the revenues to the state budget, integration of 
the Polish economy into the world economy, etc. The interests of the acquired company’s 
management in securing their position or increasing their management skills is taken into 
account to a lower degree.  
A foreign company before entering the Polish market, has had long contact with the 
Polish company. These contacts are usually contracting or subcontracting activities. In spite 
of that, the foreign company conducts a feasibility study, conducts a business valuation, 
conducts a restructuring cost assessment and analysis of overstaffing, and commits itself to  
future investments. The first action usually undertaken by the foreign firm is overstaffing 
reduction. 
From the foreign company’s perspective, the Polish subsidiary, should be an integral 
part of the foreign parent company with production focused exclusively on the Polish or the 
Central and Eastern European market. The Polish subsidiary should be a place where 
assembly of the final products from the parts provided by the parent company is made. W. Jermakowicz ... 
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Table 34. Characteristics of the acquisition process by large and small firms                                         
  Characteristics                            Large firms                                      Small firms           
  Annual sales                      More than $20 million                       Less than $20 million     
  Equity                               More than $3 million                         Less than $3 million      
  Employment                      More than 200                                  Less than 200           
  Polish negotiators               The State Agency                              Firm’s management  
  Dominant strategy              Market seeking FDI                           Efficiency seeking FDI 
  Dominant motives on       - to get access to the market               - to create expansion base to the CEE firms         
  the foreign side                                                                             
  Dominant motives on       - to collect high purchasing price       - to increase management skills             
  the Polish side                  - integration with world market          - to get access to new resources 
                                          - to preserve employment                            
  Types of contacts             - subcontracting                                 - exports/imports          
  before acquisition             - contractual cooperation                   - licensing                
                                                               
  Pre-acquisition ac-           - business valuation                           - feasibility study        
  tivities of foreign              - restructuring cost  assessment         - market research          
  firm                                  - legal audit              
                                          - analysis of over-staffing                                          
  Pre-acquisition                - asset evaluation                             - financial review         
  activities of the               - initiating compete-                         - business valuation       
  State Agency                    tive bidding process                       - debt restructuring       
                                                                                               - staff reduction          
  Promises given by           - investment commitments               - employment promise to    
  foreign company                                                                      existing management 
  Incentives given by         - tax incentives                                    
  the State Agency                                                        
  Post-acquisition              - reduction of over-staffing              - financial consolidation  
  changes                                                                                 - training of management 
  Polish company is         - an integral part of                            - a stand alone entity 
                                         foreign parent firm                         
 International ac-              - focus on Polish market                   - export                   
  tivity of new                 - export to the CEE                            - export to the Western countries 
  company                         countries of goods               
                                         assembled from parts                              
                                        provided by foreign                               
                                        parent company                                  
  
Small firms. 
Small firm privatization is usually management driven. The firm’s management   
conducts all stages of the acquisition process. The management also tends to regard their own 
interest as more important than the macro-social aspects of privatization. They seek foreign 
investment to gain access to new resources, to increase their management skills, to secure 
long term development of the firms. They also, as a rule, expect they will secure their 
management positions in the new firms, which usually happens. 
The State Agency, however, keeps an eye on the acquisition process. To increase their 
own control, it orders financial review, business valuation, debt restructuring, and reduction 
of overstaffing, which usually is not requires in the cases of large firms. 
After acquisition, the new company is usually financially consolidated, training of 
management is performed, and the marketing area is restructured. 
From the foreign parent company’s perspective the acquisition is made to increase the 
firm’s efficiency. It regards the Polish subsidiary as a stand alone entity with much autonomy Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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and independence. In most cases, this unit produces different goods or provides different 
services from the parent company. 
To close a deal, the foreign company is forced to find consensus with the Polish firm’s 
management. To secure employment for this management is an additional price that a foreign 
company has to pay to acquire the Polish firm. 
There is no doubt than in the case of small firms, the real winner is management. The 
management is usually the player in this privatization game, who is the most satisfied with 
foreign acquisition.  W. Jermakowicz ... 
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CONCLUSIONS, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Władysław W. Jermakowicz 
CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of FDI an the Poland’s economy is not impressive. The goal of attracting 
substantial foreign capital has not been achieved.  The $2.8 billion investment in Poland 
constitutes approximately 14 percent of all the investment made in Eastern and Central 
Europe and only .2 percent of worldwide investment inflows (Jermakowicz, Bellas 1994).  
The second goal of accelerating the privatization process in Poland has not been 
achieved.  Approximately $1,189.9 million of FDI in privatized Polish companies represents 
through June 1993 only 41.1 percent of all the invested capital and only 1.67 percent of the 
state-owned equity as valued in 1989 (Jermakowicz 1994).  There is no doubt that the 
internationalization of Polish enterprises has been a very weak contributor to Poland’s 
economic structure and activity.  
The third goal, the introduction of modern technologies and management practices has 
been only partially achieved and only in case of large firms.  Large firms’ investment in key 
industries seems to have contributed to Poland’s economic recovery.  This recovery was 
fostered by the increase in domestic automobile production fuelled by foreign investment in 
the automobile industry (by Fiat and GMC).  Likewise in brewing - the best performing 
subsector of the Polish economy -- most of the main breweries are owned by foreign 
companies (World 1994). Another important contribution of large transnational firms is the 
transfer of modern technology and management practices to Polish affiliates and Polish 
supplier firms. In case of International Paper, a series of technology transfer contracts were 
signed between its headquarter and its Polish subsidiary in Kwidzyń.  Furthermore, human 
resource developments and local labor-force training to help in the acceptance of Western 
quality standards in both manufacturing and services industries are in fact, a common impact 
of FDI in Poland.  For example, Fiat undertakes training of all employees in specially 
designed schools ("Automotive 1994). Also, Citibank spends $400 thousand on training each 
year (Bobiński 1994). Moreover, the transfer of many soft technologies has been 
complemented by the provision of "unique" services that used to be unavailable (or unknown) 
in Poland (Lipsey, Zimny 1994). As Kubielas (1994) points, foreign investors chose as 
investment targets rather industries qualified as technology (or capital) -intensive and human-
capital intensive and avoid traditional labor-intensive sectors. This may, be interpreted that 
Polish unqualified labor is rather expensive in relation to other possible host countries labor 
as measured by its relative productivity. 
In the case of small firms the picture is poorer.  As experts from the Polish Foreign 
Investment Agency note, most of the small foreign partners are trying to use already existing 
equipment (Sp￿łki 1990). They are using different forms of equipment and machinery leases 
and returning stock payments as shareholders’ dividends to their partners.  The capital stock 
of these companies is kept artificially low. 
The fourth goal of integrating the local markets with Euroepan markets was also 
achieved only partially. In case of large firms the picture is rather positive. The large 
multinational firms from Western Europe especially have helped establish new trade linkages 
between Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the European Union on the other, 
sometimes in the framework of regional core network strategies. For example, Asea Brown Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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Boveri’s affiliate in Poland now provides electrical engines on a globally integrated basis 
(Robinson 1994). As a result, the share  of foreign affiliates in foreign trade appears to be 
quite high.  Foreign affiliates accounted for 10 percent of total exports  and 12 percent of 
imports. To the extend that trade plays an important role in promoting growth and facilitating 
the adjustment process, it appears that the role of large corporations has been somewhat larger 
than what other indicators suggests regarding the importance of FDI in Poland. 
In the case of FDI from small firms the picture is again rather negative. The small firms 
have not fulfilled the expectations of strengthening ties with EU markets. The share of the 
total sale of goods and services accounted by small FDI enterprises is approximately 10 
percent.  More than 40% of the small firms with foreign participation are focusing on trade 
while most of the others are involved in simple food processing, textile production, and 
commodities. 
Overall, the FDI in Poland has been fairly small and uneven. But part of this 
unevenness has been that FDI has been relatively important in a number of industries, and 
areas that are central to the resumption of growth and the transition process. 
PROBLEMS 
Despite the significant acceleration of foreign investment during 1992, Poland is still 
behind other Central European countries in terms of the relative size of foreign investments 
and the role of foreign capital. In the SOEs, the privatization process, as stated before, is still 
marginal. 
Several major flaws contributed to these results.
14 
In the last five years three government institutions have been responsible for 
supervision, structure, registration, and assistance to foreign investment in Polish 
privatization. Until June 14, 1994, it was the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA), that 
monitored and controlled functions, set guidelines, and led the registration process for all new 
joint ventures and acquisitions. After June 14, 1994, and the imposition of the new Law on 
Companies with Foreign Shareholdings (Law 1991), the Foreign Investment Agency was 
transformed into a politically  independent joint stock company, the so-called State Foreign 
Investment Agency, with no political power or authority. Its role to promote foreign 
investment in privatization, and to ensure that greenfield projects and private joint ventures 
are not neglected. The Ministry of Privatization took over role of the political body 
responsible for setting guidelines, approving privatization through FDI programs, and selling 
state-owned companies to foreign investors. As a result of these changes there is no state 
agency in Poland clearly responsible for foreign direct investment.  The Ministry of 
Privatization, as a part of the state administration, is burdened with various privatization 
tasks, and this Ministry does not have the resources, know-how, or motivation to focus on 
promoting and attracting foreign investors. The State Agency for Foreign Investment 
functions as a strategic advisor to the foreign investors during negotiations with the Polish 
partners. The Agency, according to its President Marek G￿rski, is not responsible  for foreign 
investment policy and is not involved in the sale of Polish enterprises. The Agency plays only 
an advisory function (Bochniarz, Jermakowicz, Meller 1994). As an effect there is no state 
                                                 
14 According to the Foreign Investment Agency, the main reasons for the reluctance of foreign business 
entities to invest in Poland are the unstable law and taxes (91% response), social unrest (71% response), high 
investment risk (76%), strong labor unions (76%), slow pace of Polish reforms (51%), excessive employees’ 
wage claims (38%), technological backwardness of the country (32%) (Zyba‡a 1993). W. Jermakowicz ... 
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agency in Poland which is responsible for promotional activities, or for technical and 
financial support for foreign companies. Formally, two institutions are responsible, but no one 
institution really fulfills its objectives. 
Second, a high level of legal instability and uncertainty created frequent, somewhat 
chaotic changes and delays in legislation. The first example was an eight month delay in 
passing the basic privatization law which cannot be justified by the initial macroeconomic 
imbalance or the need to focus on the stabilization program (Bossak at al. 1992).  The second 
example was a delay in the passing of a legislative framework for a mass privatization 
program.  Originally, it had been expected that this law would be passed at the end of 1991.  
It  was rejected by the Sejm on March 18, 1993, and again passed by the Polish Diet three 
months later.  Other examples are the restrictive land legislation, the very late liberalization of 
the foreign investment law (only in the second half of 1991), the nationalization of casinos in 
spring 1992, or the delaying of liberalization of the insurance market for foreign firms until 
1999.  All these decisions were based on anti-foreign sentiments, especially among the 
peasants’ and nationalistic parties. 
Third, Poland is still a country with high Country Risk Rating. According to 
Euromoney (September 1989) Poland’s rating was 38.0 (1989), and  43.0 (1990), and Poland 
occupied the 75th and 74th position respectively among 133 countries. During the last five 
years five governments ruled the country and seven prime-ministers were nominated. Only 
"Solidarność," one of the few labor unions registered in Poland called more than 1000 strikes 
in this period.  From October 1991 to May 1992 some 186 of called strikes or protest actions 
were "wild" or illegal. The bureaucracy is still very strong.  The foreign investor starting his 
enterprise has to conform to 830 norms (598 state and 232 branch) and is expected to submit 
opinions from 29 administrative units in 47 different areas during the preliminary project 
analysis (Zybała 1993).  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
What can be done to increase the amount and economic impact of FDI in the Polish 
economy? First of all, a strong Foreign Investment Agency should be established. This 
Agency should be financially and administratively autonomous but backed by the government 
and operate on the "one-stop shop" principle, enabling the foreign investor to arrange 
everything related to its investments in one institution.  
The new FIA should become more active in searching for potential foreign investors. 
They should especially be sought in the neighboring developed countries which are Poland’s 
major foreign trading partners familiar with the local situation and able to appropriately 
assess risk.  Companies which already have done business in the host country are good 
prospects. These investors should be attracted by the geographical location, skilled labor, and 
easy access to natural resources.  There is little likelihood of attracting investors from Japan 
or South Korea. They tend to skip the "main course" and arrive for "dessert." 
The new Foreign Investment Agency should develop different policies toward different 
types of investors. The incentives should be given only to large investors pursuing Type II 
investment strategy. In this case FIA should institute more interventionist policies, offering 
widely-accepted incentives such as tax holidays, tax reductions,  interest subsidies, R&D 
training grants, and developed plant sites (Schriber 1992).  
Promotion should be concentrated on predefined priority areas. The first step should be 
to identify key technologies and target sectors to be attracted through inward FDI. The crucial Foreign Privatization in Poland 
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issue in the selection of target sectors is that they should represent the synergy between 
foreign investor’s wishes and what the host country  can offer in those sectors/products.
15  In 
the second step the State Agency should identify target markets, those home countries in 
which to direct major efforts to attract foreign investors.  Target markets are to an important 
degree already defined by the selection of target sector/products. For instance, selection of 
microelectronics as a target sector definitely will lead to the USA and Japan, the automobile 
industry to Germany and Japan, and the chemical industry to Germany as target market.  
To achieve this goal the Foreign Investment Agency should establish offices in selected 
West European countries and establish direct personal contacts with potential foreign 
investors. The only task of these offices is to promote the Polish FDI program. To realize this 
goal they should identify target companies/products and decision makers who should be 
persuaded to invest in Poland. They should strengthen the business image of Poland, make 
presentations in individual companies, offer help in developing adequate investment 
proposals, ensure investment proposals, and keep already established and establish new 
contacts. For each individual target market or promotion campaign, the FIA must prepare a 
specific strategy and set of methods. 
Finally, Poland needs to make major improvements in areas that are outside the scope of 
this paper.  Clear, coherent legal systems are needed to afford full legal safety.  The tax and 
tariff systems need to be reformed.  Currencies must be stabilized.  Financial markets must be 
organized and banking systems reorganized to help raise initial capital, improve external 
credit, and resolve the capacity for payment. 
                                                 
15 In Ireland key technologies and target products were defined by a range of selection criteria: a) export markets 
growth opportunities, b) low raw material import requirement, c) high value added, d) low volume (freight) e) 
skilled labor requirement in production, and e) utilization of Ireland’s natural resources (Dunning, Rojec, 1993) W. Jermakowicz ... 
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APPENDIXES 




















YEAR   OWNER-SHIP  CO. 
1   15.00   0.12   0.12   100.0%  3   1990   SPROP  USA 
2   10.00   9.00   4.50   50.0%  600   1993   JSC Ltd  DK 
3   25.00   0.66   0.66   100.0%  32   1992   JSC Ltd   JAP 
4   4.50   0.57   0.28   50.0%  74   1990   JSC Ltd  SWE 
5   3.00   1.70   1.70   100.0%  40   1992   JSC Ltd  USA 
6   50.00   5.00   3.80   76.0%  545   1990   JSC Ltd  SWI 
7   4.50   1.70   1.70   100.0%  40   1990   JSC Ltd  USA 
8   3.50   4.50   4.45   98.9%  38   1992   JSC  GB 
9   3.57   1.43   1.15    80.4%  35   1992   JSC Ltd  GER 
10   16.00   0.20   0.10    50.0%  6   1990   SPROP  USA 
11   13.00   8.00   4.00   50.0%  600   1993   JSC Ltd  FRA 
12   25.60   0.56   0.56   100.0%  32   1992   JSC Ltd  NDL 
13   2.50   0.67   0.32   50.0%  74   1990   JSC Ltd   AUS 
14   2.00   1.30   1.30   100.0%  40   1992   JSC Ltd  AUS 
15   75.00   5.64   4.10   72.7%  634   1991   JSC Ltd   FRA 
16   6.50   2.70   1.70   63.0%  40   1990   JSC Ltd  SWE 
17   6.50   4.89   3.47   71.0%  35   1992   JSC  GB 
18   3.70   1.20   1.20   100.0%  30   1991   JSC Ltd  GER 
19   3.70   0.27   0.20    74.1%  36   1991   JSC Ltd  SWI 
20   45.00   8.00   1.40   17.5%  340   1992   JSC  GER 
21   37.00   4.20   3.36   80.0%  254   1991   JSC  GER 
22   28.90   3.60   2.88   80.0%  450   1993   JSC  GER 
23   21.20   2.80   2.80   100.0%  47   1991   JSC Ltd   GER 
24   3.3   2.18   2.00    91.7%  280   1993   JSC Ltd  GER 
25   4.4   0.3   0.15   50.0%  10   1989   JSC Ltd  SWI 
26   5.4   18   17.5   97.2%  450   1993   JSC  GER 
27   70.5   27.5   27.5   100.0%  948   1991   JSC Ltd  NDL 
28      .  45   24   50.0%  700   1991   JSC  GB 
Sum  489.2   161.5   118.1     6413        
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Appendix 2. Profile of Foreign Companies (in Million US $) 
 






% OF POLISH 
EMPLOYMENT 
1   65   23.1%  77   3.90% 
2      .    5000   12.00% 
3   150000   0.0%  10000   0.32% 
5      .    330   12.12% 
6   150   33.3%  3150   17.30% 
7       .    70   57.14% 
8   7260   0.0%  3500   1.09% 
9       .    88   39.77% 
10   25   64.0%  77   7.79% 
11       .    5000   12.00% 
12   123000   0.0%  10000   0.32% 
14       .    41   97.56% 
15   160   46.9%  3200   19.81% 
16       .    671   5.96% 
17   8000   0.1%  4100   0.85% 
18       .    74   40.54% 
21       5430   4.68% 
22       1546   29.11% 
23   76   27.9%  471   9.98% 
24   120   2.8%  650   43.08% 
25       .    700   1.43% 
26   533.8   1.0%  41300   1.09% 
27   8434.21   0.8%     
28   47   0.0%  30000   2.33% 
Total  297871     125475    
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Appendix 3.  Countries in which Foreign Parent Company has Subsidiaries 
 
FIRM US DK GB  FRA  GER  SWI  NDL  NOR  CAN  JAP  SWE  AUS  OTHER TOTAL 
2     X X X X X X X X          8   
3    X X X X X X X X X X X X 128 140 
4    X X X X X X X       X X    37   
6     X X X X X X X X        1    9   
8    X X X X X X X X X X X X    80   
11   X X X X X X X X          10   
12 X X X X X X X X X X X X  85    97   
13 X X X X X X X X     X X  18    30   
15   X X X X X X X            7   
17 X X X X X X X X X X X X  56    68   
19 X X X X X X                6   
20    X  X   X      X   5   9   
2 1       X         X     2    
23  X  X  X             3   
24              2   2   
25 X X X X X X X X X X X X    9   
26 X X X X X X X X X X X X 138 150 
27   X X X X X X X          16    24   
28 X X X X X X X X X X X X    80   
TOTAL  11 16 17 16 16 16 14 13 10  7 10 10  -  21 
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1   10%  90%  10%    100%  10%  2% 
2   3%  10%  90%      1%   
3           100%  100%  100% 
4    98%  95%  5%   40%    
5             80%   
6   30%  100%      60%  20%  30% 
7             80%   
8    98%  95%  5%   40%    
9             80%   
10 10%  10%  90%    100%  10%  2% 
11 3%  10%  90%     1%   
12         100%  100%  100% 
13  98%  95%  5%   40%    
14          80%   
15 30%  100%     60%  20%  30% 
16          80%   
17  98%  95%  5%   40%    
18          80%   
19  98%  95%  5%   40%    
20  20%  45%  30% 25%  30% 40%  10% 
21  20%  60%  30% 10%  30% 40%  10% 
22  40%  90%  10%   100%   2% 
23  60%  30%  45% 25%  100% 20%  25% 
24 100%  100%  0%   100%  90%   
25  95%  0%  70% 30%  70% 99%  80% 
26 35%  35% 0%      10%   
27          55%   
28 5%  20%  80%     30% 100% 
Mean  50% 63% 30%  7%  68%  51%  41% 
 W. Jermakowicz ... 
CASE Foundation  - 72 - 
Table of Contents 
           ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  3 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE: FACTS AND ISSUES  4 
INTRODUCTION  4 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE:  A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE  5 
THE PATTERNS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE COUNTRIES  6 
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CEE COUNTRIES  9 
SOURCES OF FDI INFLOWS TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE  10 
STRATEGIES OF WESTERN INVESTORS  12 
MODES OF FDI  14 
MODELS OF FDI DEVELOPMENT  15 
CONCLUSIONS  16 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POLAND  18 
INTRODUCTION  18 
CHANGES IN LEGISLATION  18 
POLISH EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY  18 
GREENFIELD VS. ACQUISITIONS  19 
MAJORITY VS. MINORITY STAKES  22 
ORIGIN OF INVESTORS  23 
INVESTMENT PROJECTS  25 
 
TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POLAND  27 
INTRODUCTION  27 
Time  27 
Classification of Regions and Assumptions  28 
ANALYSIS BY SIX REGIONS  28 
Number, Value of Capital and Average Capitalization Size of Firm by Region  29 
Capitalization  29 
Regional Distribution of FDI by country  31 
Unemployment  33 
Degree of Urbanization  33 
Ecological Regions  33 
 
FOREIGN ACQUISITION STRATEGIES IN THE POLISH PRIVATIZATION PROCESS (SURVEY 
REVIEW)  36 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS  36 
The Characteristic of the Sample  36 
The Profile of Acquired Companies in Poland.  37 
Profile of Foreign Companies  39 
Institutional framework for privatization and foreign direct investment in Poland.  39 
PRE-ACQUISITION STAGE  40 
Motivation of foreign Parent Company  40 
Other alternatives to investment in Poland  41 
Motivation on the Polish side  43 
The major objectives of acquisition expressed by the State Agency  44 
Disagreements between management and government agency  45 
Privatization or greenfield investment  45 
Acquisition modes applied  46 
Reasons for choosing JV acquisition  47 
Control over company  48 
Contacts before acquisition  49 
Pre-acquisition activities  49 
ACQUISITION  51 
Major elements of acquisition  51 
Incentives offered to the foreign parent company by the government agency  52 
Negotiators  54 Foreign Privatization in Poland 
                                                  - 73 -                                                        CASE Foundation 
POST-ACQUISITION 55 
Post-acquisition changes introduced by the foreign parent company  55 
Operational aspects of the acquired company  56 
Balance of payments aspects  57 
Technological and research and development aspects  58 
What type of cooperation is it?  59 
RECOMMENDATIONS 59 
CONCLUSIONS  60 
Large firms  60 
Small firms.  61 
 
CONCLUSIONS, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  63 
CONCLUSIONS  63 
PROBLEMS  64 
RECOMMENDATIONS 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 67 
APPENDIXES  69 
Table of Contents  73 
 
 